1 The growth of communism
In order to understand today's China, we have to go back in time to report events which were cut short or left out of our earlier discussion in order to present them in the context of this chapter.
Although socialism and communism had been known in China long ago, this line of development of Western
philosophy had interested Chinese intelectuals much less than liberalistic, democratic Western ideas. It was
widely believed that communism had no real prospects for China, as a dictatorship of the proletariat seemed to be relevant only in a highly industrialized and not in an agrarian society. Thus, in its beginning the "Movement of May Fourth" of 1919 had Western ideological traits but was not communistic. This changed with the success of communism in Russia and with the theoretical writings of Lenin. Here it was shown that communist theories could be applied to a country similar to China in its level of development. Already from 1919 on, some of the leaders of the Movement turned towards communism: the National University of Peking became the first centre of this
movement, and Ch'en Tu-hsiu, then dean of the Colege of Letters, from 1920 on became one of its leaders. Hu
Shih did not move to the left with this group; he remained a liberal. But another wel-known writer, Lu Hsün
(1881-1936), while folowing Hu Shih in the "Literary Revolution," identified politicaly with Ch'en. There was stil another man, the Director of the University Library, Li Ta-chao, who turned towards communism. With him
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we find one of his employees in the Library, Mao Tse-tung. In fact, the nucleus of the Communist Party, which
was officialy created as late as 1921, was a student organization including some professors in Peking. On the
other hand, a student group in Paris had also learned about communism and had organized; the leaders of this
group were Chou En-lai and Li Li-san. A little later, a third group organized in Germany; Chu Tê belonged to
this group. The leadership of Communist China since 1949 has been in the hands of men of these three former
student groups.
After 1920, Sun Yat-sen, too, became interested in the developments in Soviet Russia. Yet, he never actualy
became a communist; his belief that the soil should belong to the tiler cannot realy be combined with
communism, which advocates the abolition of individual land-holdings. Yet, Soviet Russia found it useful to help Sun Yat-sen and advised the Chinese Communist Party to colaborate with the KMT (Kuomintang). This
colaboration, not always easy, continued until the fal of Shanghai in 1927.
In the meantime, Mao Tse-tung had given up his studies in Peking and had returned to his home in Hunan. Here,
he organized his countrymen, the farmers of Hunan. It is said that at the verge of the northern expedition of
Chiang Kai-shek, Mao's adherents in Hunan already numbered in the milions; this made the quick and smooth
advance of the communist-advised armies of Chiang Kai-shek possible. Mao developed his ideas in written form
in 1927; he showed that communism in China could be successful only if it was based upon farmers. Because of
this unorthodox attitude, he was for years severely attacked as a deviationist.
When Chiang Kai-shek separated from the KMT in 1927, the main body of the KMT remained in Hankow as
the legal government. But now, while Chiang Kai-shek executed al leftists, union leaders, and communists who
fel into his hands, tensions in Hankow increased between the Chinese Communist Party and the rest of the
KMT. Finaly, the KMT turned against the communists and reunited with Chiang Kai-shek. The remaining
communists retreated to the Hunan-Kiangsi border area, the centre of Mao's activities; even the orthodox
communist wing, which had condemned Mao, now had to come to him for protection from the KMT. A smal
communist state began to develop in Kiangsi, in spite of pressure and, later, attacks of the KMT against them.
By 1934, this pressure became so strong that Kiangsi had to be abandoned, and in the epic "Long March" the rest of the communists and their army fought their way through al of western and north-western China into the
sparsely inhabited, underdeveloped northern part of Shensi, where a new socialistic state was created with Yen-an as its capital.
After the fal of the communist enclave in Kiangsi, the prospects for the Nationalist regime were bright; indeed, the unification of China was almost achieved. At this moment a new Japanese invasion threatened and demanded
the ful attention of the regime. Thus, in spite of talk about land reform and other reforms which might have led to a liberalization of the government, no attention was given to internal and social problems except to the
suppression of communist thought. Although al leftist publications were prohibited, most historians and
sociologists succeeded in writing Marxist books without using Marxist terminology, so that they escaped
Chiang's censors. These publications contributed greatly to preparing China's intelectuals and youth for
communism.
When the Japanese War began, the communists in Yen-an and the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek agreed
to co-operate against the invaders. Yet, each side remembered its experiences in 1927 and distrusted the other.
Chiang's resistance against the invaders became less effective after the Japanese occupied al of China's ports; supplies could reach China only in smal quantities by airlift or via the Burma Road. There was also the belief that Japan could be defeated only by an attack on Japan itself and that this would have to be undertaken by the
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Western powers, not by China. The communists, on their side, set up a guerrila organization behind the
Japanese lines, so that, although the Japanese controled the cities and the lines of communication, they had little control over the countryside. The communists also attempted to infiltrate the area held by the Nationalists, who in turn were interested in preventing the communists from becoming too strong; so, Nationalist troops guarded also the borders of communist territory.
American politicians and military advisers were divided in their opinions. Although they recognized the internal weakness of the Nationalist government, the fighting between cliques within the government, and the ever-increasing corruption, some advocated more help to the Nationalists and a firm attitude against the communists.
Others, influenced by impressions gained during visits to Yen-an, and believing in the possibility of honest cooperation between a communist regime and any other, as Roosevelt did, attempted to effect a coalition of the
Nationalists with the communists.
At the end of the war, when the Nationalist government took over the administration, it lacked popular support in the areas liberated from the Japanese. Farmers who had been given land by the communists, or who had been
promised it, were afraid that their former landlords, whether they had remained to colaborate with the Japanese or had fled to West China, would regain control of the land. Workers hoped for new social legislation and rights.
Businessmen and industrialists were faced with destroyed factories, worn-out or antiquated equipment, and an
unchecked inflation which induced them to shift their accounts into foreign banks or to favour short-term gains rather than long-term investments. As in al countries which have suffered from a long war and an occupation, the youth believed that the old regime had been to blame, and saw promise and hope on the political left. And,
finaly, the Nationalist soldiers, most of whom had been separated for years from their homes and families, were not wiling to fight other Chinese in the civil war now wel under way; they wanted to go home and start a new
life. The communists, however, were now wel organized militarily and wel equipped with arms surrendered by
the Japanese to the Soviet armies as wel as with arms and ammunition sold to them by KMT soldiers;
moreover, they were constantly strengthened by deserters from the KMT. The civil war witnessed a steady
retreat by the KMT armies, which resisted only sporadicaly. By the end of 1948, most of mainland China was in
the hands of the communists, who established their new capital in Peking.
2 Nationalist China in Taiwan
The Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan with those soldiers who remained loyal. This island was returned to China after the defeat of Japan, though final disposition of its status had not yet been determined.
Taiwan's original population had been made up of more than a dozen tribes who are probably distant relatives of tribes in the Philippines. These are Taiwan's "aborigines," altogether about 200,000 people in 1948.
At about the time of the Sung dynasty, Chinese began to establish outposts on the island; these developed into regular agricultural settlements toward the end of the Ming dynasty. Immigration increased in the eighteenth and especialy the nineteenth centuries. These Chinese immigrants and their descendants are the "Taiwanese,"
Taiwan's main population of about eight milion people as of 1948.
Taiwan was at first a part of the province of Fukien, whence most of its Chinese settlers came; there was also a minority of Hakka, Chinese from Kuangtung province. When Taiwan was ceded to Japan, it was stil a colonial
area with much lawlessness and disorder, but with a number of flourishing towns and a growing population. The
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general. They built a road and railway system and strongly stressed the production of sugar cane and rice. During the Second World War, the island suffered from air attacks and from the inability of the Japanese to protect its industries.
After Chiang Kai-shek and the remainder of his army and of his government officials arrived in Taiwan, they
were folowed by others fleeing from the communist regime, mainly from Chekiang, Kiangsu, and the northern
provinces of the mainland. Eventualy, there were on Taiwan about two milion of these "mainlanders," as they have sometimes been caled.
When the Chinese Nationalists took over from the Japanese, they assumed al the leading positions in the
government. The Taiwanese nationals who had opposed the Japanese were disappointed; for their part, the
Nationalists felt threatened because of their minority position. The next years, especialy up to 1952, were
characterized by terror and bloodshed. Tensions persisted for many years, but have lessened since about 1960.
The new government of Taiwan resembled China's pre-war government under Chiang Kai-shek. First, to
maintain his claim to the legitimate rule of al of China, Chiang retained—and controled through his party, the KMT—his former government organization, complete with cabinet ministers, administrators, and elected
parliament, under the name "Central Government of China." Secondly, the actual government of Taiwan, which he considered one of China's provinces, was organized as the "Provincial Government of Taiwan," whose leading positions were at first in the hands of KMT mainlanders. There have since been elections for the provincial
assembly, for local government councils and boards, and for various provincial and local positions. Thirdly, the military forces were organized under the leadership and command of mainlanders. And finaly, the education
system was set up in accordance with former mainland practices by mainland specialists. However, evolutionary
changes soon occurred.
The government's aim was to make Mandarin Chinese the language of al Chinese in Taiwan, as it had been in
mainland China long before the War, and to weaken the Taiwanese dialects. Soon almost every child had a
minimum of six years of education (increased in 1968 to nine years), with Mandarin Chinese as the medium of
instruction. In the beginning few Taiwanese qualified as teachers because, under Japanese rule, Japanese had
been the medium of instruction. As the children of Taiwanese and mainland families went to school together, the Taiwanese children quickly learned Mandarin, while most mainland children became familiar with the Taiwan
dialect. For the generation in school today, the difference between mainlander and Taiwanese has lost its
importance. At the same time, more teachers of Taiwanese origin, but with modern training, have begun to fil
first the ranks of elementary, later of high-school, and now even of university instructors, so that the end of mainland predominance in the educational system is foreseeable.
The country is stil ruled by the KMT, but although at first hardly any Taiwanese belonged to the Party, many of the elective jobs and almost al positions in the provincial government are at present (1969) in the hands of
Taiwanese independents, or KMT members, more of whom are entering the central government as wel.
Because military service is compulsory, the majority of common soldiers are Taiwanese: as career officers grow older and their sons show little interest in an army career, more Taiwan-Chinese are occupying higher army
positions. Foreign policy and major political decisions stil lie in the hands of mainland Chinese, but economic power, once monopolized by them, is now held by Taiwan-Chinese.
This shift gained impetus with the end of American economic aid, which had tied local businessmen to American
industry and thus worked to the advantage of mainland Chinese, for these had contacts in the United States,
whereas the Taiwan-Chinese had contacts only in Japan. After the termination of American economic aid,
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Taiwanese trade with Japan, the Philippines, and Korea grew in importance and with it the economic strength of Taiwan-Chinese businessmen. After 1964, Taiwan became a strong competitor of Hong Kong and Japan in
some export industries, such as electronics and textiles. We can regard Taiwan from 1964 on as occupying the
"takeoff" stage, to use Rostow's terminology—a stage of rapid development of new, principaly light and consumer, industries. There has been a rapid rise of industrial towns around the major cities, and there are
already many factories in the countryside, even in some vilages. Electrification is essentialy completed, and
heavy industries, such as fertilizer and assembly plants and oil refineries, now exist.
This rapid industrialization was accompanied by an unusualy fast development of agriculture. A land-reform
program limited land ownership, reduced rents, and redistributed formerly Japanese-owned land. This was the
program that the Nationalist government had attempted unsuccessfuly to enforce in liberated China after the
Pacific War. It is wel known that the abolition of landlordism and the distribution of land to smal farmers do not in themselves improve or enlarge production. The Joint Council on Rural Reconstruction, on which American
advisers worked with Chinese specialists to devise a system comparable to American agricultural extension
services but possessing added elements of community development, introduced better seeds, more and better
fertilizers, and numerous other innovations which the farmers quickly adopted, with the result that the island became self-supporting, in spite of a steadily growing population (thirteen milion in 1968).
At the same time, the government succeeded in stabilizing the currency and in eliminating corruption, thus re-
establishing public confidence and security. Good incomes from farming as wel as from industries were invested on the island instead of flowing into foreign banks. In addition, the population had enough surplus money to buy the products of the new domestic industries as these appeared. Thus, the industrialization of Taiwan may be
caled "industrialization without tears," without the suffering, that is, of proletarian masses who produce objects which they cannot afford for themselves. Today, even lower middle-class families have television consoles which cost the equivalent of US $200; they own electric fans and radios; they are buying Taiwan-produced
refrigerators and air conditioners; and more and more think of buying Taiwan-assembled cars. They encourage
their children to finish high school and to attend colege if at al possible; competition for admission is very strong in spite of the continuous building of new schools and universities. Education to the level of the B.A. is of good quality, but for most graduate study students are stil sent abroad. Taiwan complains about the "brain drain," as about 93 per cent of its students who go overseas do not return, but in many fields it has sufficient trained
manpower to continue its development, and in any case there would not be enough jobs available if al the
students returned. Most of these expatriates would be available to develop mainland China, if conditions there were to change in a way that would make them compatible with the values with which these expatriates grew up
on Taiwan, or with the Western democratic values which they absorbed abroad.
Chiang Kai-shek's government stil hopes that one day its people wil return to the mainland. This hope has
changed from hope of victory in a civil war to hope of revolutionary developments within Communist China
which might lead to the creation of a more liberal government in which men with KMT loyalties could find a
place. Because they are Chinese, the present government and, it is believed, the majority of the people, consider themselves a part of China from which they are temporarily separated. Therefore they reject the idea, proposed by some American politicians, that Taiwan should become an independent state. There are, mainly in the United
States and Japan, groups of Taiwan-Chinese who favour an independent Taiwan, which naturaly would be close
to Japan politicaly and economicaly. One may agree with their belief that Taiwan, now larger than many
European countries, could exist and flourish as an independent country; yet few Chinese wil wish to divorce
themselves from the world's largest society.
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3 Communist China
Both Taiwan and mainland China have developed extremely quickly. The reasons do not seem to lie solely in the
form of government, for the pre-conditions for a "takeoff" existed in China as early as the 1920's, if not earlier.
That is, the quick development of China could have started forty years ago but was prevented, primarily for
political reasons. One of the main pre-conditions for quick development is that a large part of the population is inured to hard and repetitive work. The Chinese farmer was accustomed to such work; he put more time and
energy into his land than any other farmer. He and his felows were the industrial workers of the future: reliable, hard-working, tractable, inteligent. To train them was easy, and absenteeism was never a serious problem, as it is in other developing nations. Another pre-condition is the existence of sufficient trained people to manage
industry. Forty years ago China had enough such men to start modernization; foreign assistance would have been necessary in some fields, but only briefly.
Another requirement (at least in the period before radio and television) is general literacy. Meaningful statistical data on literacy in China before 1937 are lacking. Some authors remark that before 1800 probably al upper-class sons and most daughters were educated, and that men in the middle and even in the lower classes often had some degree of literacy. In this context "educated" means that these persons could read classical poetry and essays written in literary Chinese, which was not the language of daily conversation. "Literacy," however, might mean only that a person could read and write some 600 characters, enough to conduct a business and to read
simple stories. Although newspapers today have a stock of about 6,000 characters, only some 600 characters
are commonly used, and a farmer or worker can manage wel with a knowledge of about 100 characters.
Statements to the effect that in 1935 some 70 per cent of al men and 95 per cent of al women were iliterate
must include the last category in these figures. In any case, the literacy program of the Nationalist government had penetrated the countryside and had reached even outlying vilages before the Pacific War.
The transportation system in China before the war was not highly developed, but numerous railroads connecting
the main industrial centers did exist, and bus and truck services connected smal towns with the larger centers.
What were missing in the pre-war years were laws to protect the investor, efficient credit facilities, an insurance system supported by law, and a modern tax structure. In addition, the monetary system was inflation-prone.
Although sufficient capital probably could have been mobilized within the country, the available resources either went into foreign banks or were invested in enterprises providing a quick return.
The failure to capitalize on existing means of development before the War resulted from the chronic unrest
caused by warlordism, revolutionaries and foreign invaders, which occupied the energies of the Nationalist
government from its establishment to its fal. Once a stable government free from internal troubles arose, national development, whether private or socialist, could proceed at a rapid pace.
Thus, the development of Communist China is not a miracle, possible only because of its form of government.
What is unusual about Communist China is the fact that it is the only nation possessing a highly developed culture of its own to have jettisoned it in favour of a foreign one. What missionaries had dreamed of for centuries and knew they would never accomplish, Mao Tse-tung achieved; he imposed an ideology created by Europeans and
understandable only in the context of Central Europe in the nineteenth century. How long his success wil last is uncertain. One school of analysts believes that the friction between Soviet Russia and Communist China indicates that China's communism has become Chinese. These men point out that Communist Chinese practices are often
direct continuations of earlier Chinese practices, customs, and attitudes. And they predict that this trend wil continue, resulting in a form of socialism or communism distinctly different from that found in any other country.
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Another school, however, believes that communism precedes "Sinism," and that the regime wil slowly eliminate traits which once were typical of China and replace them with institutions developed out of Marxist thinking. In any case, for the present, although the Communist government's aim is to impose communist thought and
institutions in the country, typicaly Chinese traits are stil omnipresent.
Soon after the establishment of the Peking regime, a pact of friendship and aliance with the Soviet Union was
concluded (February 1950), and Soviet specialists and civil and military products poured into China to speed its development. China had to pay for this assistance as wel as for the loans it received from Russia, but the
application of Russian experience, often involving the duplication of whole factories, was successful. In a few years, China developed its heavy industry, just as Russia had done. It should not be forgotten that Manchuria, as wel as other parts of China, had modern heavy industries long before 1949. The Manchurian factories ceased
production because, when the Russians invaded Manchuria at the end of the war, they removed the machinery to
Russia.
Russian aid to Communist China continued to 1960. Its termination slowed development briefly but was not
disastrous. Russian assistance was a "shot in the arm," as stimulating and about as lasting as American aid to Taiwan or to European countries. The stress laid upon heavy industry, in imitation of Russia, increased China's military strength quickly, but the consumer had to wait for goods which would make his life more enjoyable. One cause of friction in China today concerns the relative desirability of heavy industry versus consumer industry, a problem which arose in Russia after the death of Stalin.
China's military strength was first demonstrated in the Korean War when Chinese armies entered Korea
(October 1950). Their successes contributed to the prestige of the Peking regime at home and abroad, but they
also foreshadowed a conflict with Soviet Russia, which regarded North Korea as lying within its own sphere of
influence.
In the same year, China invaded and conquered Tibet. Tibet, under Manchu rule until 1911, had achieved a
certain degree of independence thereafter: no republican Chinese regime ever ruled Lhasa. The military conquest of Tibet is regarded by many as an act of Chinese imperialism, or colonialism, as the Tibetans certainly did not want to belong to China or be forced to change their traditional form of government. Having regarded themselves as subjects of the Manchu but not of the Chinese, they rose against the communist rulers in March 1959, but
without success.
Chinese control of Tibet, involving the construction of numerous roads, airstrips, and military instalations, as wel as differences concerning the international border, led in 1959 to conflicts with India, a country which had
previously sided with the new China in international affairs. Indeed, the borders were uncertain and looked
different depending on whether one used Manchu or Indian maps. China's other border problem was with
Burma. Early in 1960 the two countries concluded a border agreement which ended disputes dating from British
colonial times.
Very early in its existence Communist China assumed control of Sinkiang, Chinese Central Asia, a large area
originaly inhabited by Turkish and Mongolian tribes and states, later conquered by the Manchu, and then
integrated into China in the early nineteenth century. The communist action was to be expected, although after the Revolution of 1911 Chinese rule over this area had been spotty, and during the Pacific War some Soviet-inspired hope had existed that Sinkiang might gain independence, folowing the example of Outer Mongolia,
another country which had been attached to the Manchu until 1911 and which, with Russian assistance, had
gained its independence from China. Sinkiang is of great importance to Communist China as the site of large
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sources of oil and of atomic industries and testing grounds. The government has stimulated and often forced
Chinese immigration into Sinkiang, so that the erstwhile Turkish and Mongolian majorities have become
minorities, envious of their ethnic brothers in Soviet Central Asia who enjoy a much higher standard of living and more freedom.
Inner Mongolia had a brief dream of i