Naval Warfare in World War Two by Bill Brady - HTML preview

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

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BATTLESHIP TIRPITZ

The 52 000 ton German battleship Tirpitz when commissioned in 1941, was the largest battleship in the world, with 8 x 15" guns and a speed of 31 knots. Tirpitz was named after Admiral Tirpitz who was the driving force that made Imperial Germany’s High Seas Fleet a major naval power. Bismarck was the ‘Iron Chancellor’ who unified Germany. Ironically, both men represented the beginning and end of the German Empire. Bismarck created the Empire in 1871 whilst Admiral Tirpitz led it into a naval race, resulting in war with Great Britain, and eventual defeat

Following the sinking of the Bismarck after the action with Hood and Prince of Wales, Tirpitz was deployed in 1942 to Norwegian waters where she remained for the rest of her career, principally to guard against a British invasion that was Hitler’s fantasy and be a constant menace to supply lines. From Norway, Tirpitz could attack Allied convoys to the Soviet Union or make a break for the Atlantic, as did Bismarck. Her presence alone, constituted a strategic threat as she was in effect a ‘fleet in being’.

This concept of a ‘fleet in being’ occurs when a naval force is smaller than its adversary and therefore unwilling to engage in full fleet combat, but is strong enough to cause concern to the superior naval power. This is due to its capacity to emerge and disrupt sea routes or catch and overwhelm part of the superior power's naval forces.

She had a crew of two thousand five hundred men and was very similar to her sister ship Bismarck, only slightly larger. She completely outclassed the older British battleships and even the new King George V class was not so well armoured nor so fast, although they did fire a heavier broadside. If these two giant German ships, namely Bismarck and Tirpitz together with other German surface units had been allowed to roam the Atlantic, the lifeline from Canada and the USA would certainly have been cut. Churchill wrote that the destruction, or even the crippling, of these ships was top priority, and their elimination would alter the entire naval situation worldwide.

Though Tirpitz never at any stage came into contact with Allied shipping, her great power caused the Royal Navy to divert badly needed resources and generated intense efforts to put her out of action. Considerable forces had to be maintained at Scapa Flow that could be otherwise employed in vital theatres of operations. The Royal Navy attacked the battleship on a number of occasions with midget submarines plus carrier based aircraft and repeated attempts were also made by RAF Bomber Command to sink her.

Tirpitz only fired her main guns offensively once during a 1943 raid on allied shore facilities at Spitzbergen. She did, however, represent the last real Atlantic surface threat faced by the Allies. In March 1942 Tirpitz left Trondheim to attack a Russian bound convoy. She did not go undetected; the British submarine Seawolf, stationed off the coast, sighted and reported Tirpitz's movements; resulting in the Home Fleet calling up three battleships and the aircraft carrier Victorious. German radio intelligence intercepted this information and Tirpitz was recalled. But en route to base she was attacked by torpedo aircraft from the carrier. In a furious battle lasting only eight minutes the Tirpitz escaped all the torpedoes and shot down seven of her attackers. Unscathed, she steamed back into the fjord, a lucky escape from the fierce and resolute British attack. Consequently Hitler ordered that warships were in future only to leave their anchorage when there was no danger of a British aircraft carrier being involved.

Perhaps the most powerful and tragic demonstration of the influence of this giant battleship came in the summer of 1942, when the mere threat of her being at sea was the direct cause of the dispersal and near annihilation of the ill-fated Convoy PQ-17. We will deal with this later in much more detail together with other incidents in the life and times of the Tirpitz.

In September 1943 a British midget submarine raid did cause serious damage. And in February 1944, while she was still under repair, the German battleship was the target of an unsuccessful raid by Soviet bombers. In April 1944 as her repairs were being completed, Tirpitz was attacked by British carrier based planes, receiving hits that caused major damage. Further repairs lasted until June, and she was again attacked by the Fleet Air Arm. In mid-September, she was hit with bombs dropped by RAF heavy bombers. Finally, on 12th November 1944, Tirpitz was hit by several ‘Tall Boy’ heavy bombs, causing massive damage. She listed heavily, her magazine exploded and she met her end, taking a thousand seamen with her.

Besides tying down enormous British resources, the fear of the Tirpitz breaking out to the Atlantic prompted one of the most daring raids of World War Two, the attack upon the heavily-defended French port of St. Nazaire in March 1942. For if the Tirpitz had broken out into the Atlantic, it was most likely that she would seek shelter in a base on the west coast of France, and the only dry dock capable of accommodating her was the great 'Normandie' dock at St. Nazaire. Therefore, the Admiralty decided to put this dock out of action.

The overall objective of the raid on St. Nazaire was successfully achieved, aerial reconnaissance showed that the gates of the lock were utterly demolished, and docking the Tirpitz would be impossible. Crippling the battleship itself, however, was still the chief priority, and three days after the St .Nazaire raid 33 bombers attacked the Tirpitz while it lay near Trondheim, but neither this raid, nor two more strikes scored any hits. Bad weather and an efficient smokescreen shrouded the target as it lay in the narrow fjord. The aircraft attacked in 2 waves; the first attack by high-flying Lancaster’s followed by low level Halifax’s. Twenty 2 ton bombs were dropped, none of which hit, and 5 bombers were shot down.

The battleship was actually extremely difficult to attack. She was secured in a narrow fjord, covered with camouflage nets and high mountains on either side. On top of this air-raid warnings set off an elaborate smoke screen system to rapidly obscure the Tirpitz. On the following night there was a repeat attack by 30 bombers which was again foiled by the German smoke screen. Bombs and mines were dropped around the obscured battleship, but again without success, for the loss of 2 bombers.

Within a month Bomber Command managed to make 3 attacks, a not inconsiderable achievement in view of the atrocious weather conditions. Twelve aircraft out of 107 were lost without inflicting any damage whatsoever. Something else was required but before an alternative could be planned the Tirpitz was to achieve her greatest indirect success.

In June 1942 Tirpitz and other German capital warships targeted convoy PQ-17 consisting of 34 merchantmen escorted by 6 destroyers and 2 cruisers. British reconnaissance aircraft sighted and reported that a German battle squadron had put to sea. This resulted in a disastrous and much debated decision by the Admiralty. First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, realising that the Home Fleet was hundreds of miles away and that the cruisers and destroyers escorting the convoy were no match for their opponents, ordered the escort to withdraw while the merchantmen were told to scatter. The unprotected merchantmen were left to attempt to reach their destination independently. German naval command intercepted these reports and ordered the battle squadron to discontinue the operation and return to base, leaving the merchantmen to be picked off by U Boats and land based aircraft.

The Tirpitz battle squadron played no part in the actual slaughter, their job was done as soon as the convoy scattered. The Admiralty panic order gave the German naval and air forces an unbelievable chance of easy plunder which they readily seized. In the next three days Allied merchant ships were sunk by bombs or torpedoes. Only 10 ships eventually reached Russia. The mere threat of the surface attack had worked; without firing a gun, and without even getting within 500 kilometres of PQ 17, Tirpitz had achieved one of the most outstanding naval successes of the war.

An attempt by the British to put the Tirpitz out of action using human torpedoes known as Chariots took place in October 1942. A Norwegian, Leif Larsen, who had escaped from Norway to Britain, was put in charge of the operation. A fishing boat was used to tow the chariots until they were close to the target. On the morning of 26th October they sailed for Norway, but on 29th October the generator to recharge the Chariots' batteries broke down.

The operation continued in the hope that the Chariot batteries were sufficiently charged. But when the Chariots got undetected to within 16 kilometres of their target, the batteries went flat. The disappointed crew scuttled the fishing boat and Chariots and made their way to Sweden. In September 1943 a German battle squadron consisting of Tirpitz, Scharnhorst and 9 destroyers attacked the Allied base on Spitzbergen. Tirpitz and Scharnhorst opened fire with their main armament and German destroyers ran inshore with landing parties. Some prisoners were taken, a supply dump and wireless station wrecked before the German ships returned safely to base. For the only time in her existence Tirpitz had fired her main armament offensively. Although her crew were not to know it, Tirpitz had carried out her last operation, for in the 14 months remaining to her, she was to come under relentless attacks. The British decided to use midget submarines known as X- craft towed by submarines in an attempt to cripple or even sink the Tirpitz. Specialised training was carried out in Scotland during the summer of 1943.

The X-craft would be manned by a transit crew and when they were close to the target they were replaced by an operational crew. The submarines towing their X craft left their base in Scotland. Three had their tow lines parted and were separated for over 36 hours before two were found again and continued the passage. But one was lost without trace with her transit crew. Due to technical problems another was forced to scuttle the craft and the crew taken on board the submarine.

Throughout 18th September the submarines continued to tow the 4 remaining X-craft and on arriving at their rendezvous point the operational crews were transferred. They successfully manoeuvred through a minefield on the surface and then dived at dawn to continue through the fjord for the final run in to their target that was sheltered behind anti torpedo nets only 6 km’s ahead. Two of them after overcoming this hazard reached the Tirpitz. One of the X craft however, malfunctioned and broke surface. She was seen from the deck of Tirpitz, mistakenly identified as a porpoise and disregarded. She was not so fortunate a second time when, after the crew attached both charges, she again broke surface and was identified correctly.

The X craft met with a fusillade of small arms fire and hand grenades; escape was impossible. The crew scuttled the craft and surrendered to a German picket-boat and taken aboard the Tirpitz. Meanwhile two other X craft had attached their charges to the Tirpitz. The fourth X craft had become entangled in the antisubmarine nets, but eventually broke clear and attached the charges to the Tirpitz. This craft then experienced technical problems, surfaced and was forced to surrender.

German divers checked the hull of Tirpitz for limpet mines and a wire was being drawn along the battleship's hull when 2 violent explosions caused the Tirpitz to leap upwards several metres. All the lighting circuits and much of the power supply were put out of action and the ship settled down with a list to port. The attack had been a tremendous success. For the loss of only nine men killed and six men captured the battleship had been severely damaged; Tirpitz’s main engines were put out of action and the after- turrets damaged. German casualties were one man killed and forty wounded.

Of the 6 X-craft which set out none returned but the six men taken prisoner came safely home after the war. Both Lieutenants Place and Cameron were awarded the Victoria Cross for the successful placing of their charges. Sub-Lieutenants Lorimer, Kendall and Aitken received the Distinguished Service Order, and crewman Goddard the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal. In the German archives captured after the war was a report that ‘as a result of the successful midget submarine attack the battleship Tirpitz has been put out of action for 6 months’. In fact, she did not move from her anchorage until April, 1944, after extensive repair work had been carried out. She was then moved to Tromsø Fjord.

The loss of the Battle Cruiser Gneisenau, bombed in dry dock in Germany after the Channel dash, had dissuaded Hitler from risking the return to Germany of Tirpitz and there was no dry dock big enough to take her in Norway. The British Admiralty decided that the Fleet Air Arm should attack Tirpitz as soon as the aircraft carrier Victorious had completed her refit trials. The capital ships of the Home Fleet consisting of Duke of York, Anson, Victorious, and Belfast, together with other carriers and destroyers steamed to Norway.

By dawn on 3rd April 1944, the still undetected combined force was in position. The first of the Corsairs took off from Victorious, followed by Barracudas, Wildcats and Hellcats from the other carriers. As the strike was approaching Tirpitz the smoke screen ashore was activated. The Corsairs remained at 3 000 metres to cover the Barracudas against counter-attack. The Wildcats and Hellcats came in low over the hills, strafing the battleship with machine-gun fire as the Barracudas began their bombing dives. The bombs were meant to be dropped from a height above 1 000 metres to ensure penetration of the armoured deck but in their enthusiasm and determination to achieve accuracy most of the pilots dived much lower than this. Six direct hits were claimed plus 3 probable hits and the battleship's upper deck was left bloody with the wounded.

As the first strike was attacking the second strike made for Tirpitz. The Hellcats attacked the battleship's anti-aircraft positions with the Wildcats strafing the unprotected bridge and upper deck before the Barracudas came in to the attack. Eight definite and 5 probable hits being claimed, but the 725 kg bomb which hit the bows failed to explode. By 08 00 hours all the aircraft had landed back on their carriers except for 2 Barracudas shot down. In just 2 minutes the Fleet Air Arm had ruined much of the 6 months of repair work and had done incalculable harm to morale. The upper deck was a shambles and the casualty list formidable. One hundred and twenty two men had been killed and three hundred and sixteen wounded including the captain, many of them by the machine gun fire from the fighters. It was not until June 1944 that Tirpitz could recommence trials.

On 17th July 1944, another attack was mounted by the Fleet Air Arm. Forty four Barracudas, loaded with 450 kg and 225 kg bombs were escorted by 18 Corsairs and 15 Hellcats. Tirpitz received warning of the approach of a large formation of aircraft, and the battleship was totally obscured by a smoke screen. No hits were observed and 1 Barracuda and 1 Corsair were lost.

The Tirpitz was only finally destroyed when British inventor, Sir Barnes Wallis, built a special bomb for the job. The same man who had previously developed the bouncing bomb used in the Dambusters Raid. In 1944 he devised the ‘Tallboy’, a five and a half ton bomb capable of piercing the Tirpitz's armour plating. A most devastating bomb designed for accurate flight and great penetration.

As the war progressed both the technique and technology of the Royal Air Force had increased enormously. The combination of the genius of Barnes Wallis together with the inspiring leadership of Wing Commander Guy Gibson led to the creation of the elite 617 squadron. The most determined and skilled squadron in Bomber Command.

The Tirpitz was attacked again on 29th October. Thirty seven Lancaster’s were dispatched from Lossiemouth, Scotland. The removal of the mid-upper gun turrets and the installation of extra fuel tanks meant the Tirpitz could now be reached directly from land. Thirty two aircraft released Tallboys but no direct hits were scored. Early in the morning of 12th November, 32 Lancaster’s took off on the final raid against Tirpitz, aptly named Operation ‘Catechism’. As the Lancaster’s came over the mountain range they were met with intense anti-aircraft fire from Tirpitz, shore batteries and flak ships, but the battleship herself lay clearly visible. Astonishingly there was no smoke-screen or fighter cover. The Lancaster’s were equipped with the new and deadly Mark XIV bombsight and conditions were ideal.

Twenty nine bombs were dropped. The first bombs narrowly missed the target, but then a great yellow flash burst on the foredeck and the Tirpitz was seen to tremble as it was hit by another two Tallboys. A column of steam and smoke shot up to about 100 metres and within a few minutes the ship started to list badly. Flames and smoke belched out of Tirpitz's stricken hull, and she immediately took on a list of 30 degrees to port. No ship, not even Tirpitz, could withstand direct hits by such great bombs. Aboard the stricken vessel counter flooding had been ordered to correct the list, but the already slim chances of saving the ship were quickly crushed by another bomb spectacularly obliterating one of her main turrets, while further near misses shook the ship violently.

Her end came very suddenly. The first two direct hits had pierced her vitals and while she listed still further, her after-magazines blew up with a tremendous explosion, causing her immediately to roll over. As the last of the Lancaster’s flew homewards, the crews could see the ‘Lone Queen of the North’, as she was now called, was dead. The lack of fighters and smokescreen proved to be disastrous.

How did the German precautions fail? The 8 German fighters which took off had been misdirected and recalled before they reached the Tirpitz. Investigation into the failure of the smokescreen revealed that it had not been operational due to repairs. More than one thousand men were trapped when she heeled over so suddenly. Over eighty of these picked their way through the various decks to the upturned bottom of the hull, upon which they knocked furiously, attracting the attention of those outside. A hole was cut in the steel hull through which they escaped, 30 hours after the battleship turned turtle. Other knockings were heard too, but before the unfortunate men could be reached, the waters of the fjord filled their compartments. The rescue teams heard the sailors chanting ‘Deutschland Uber Alles' before silence settled upon the hull.

Tirpitz had perhaps the most inglorious and tragic career of any warship in World War Two. She never saw action with an Allied convoy or battle fleet and activities were limited to scurrying from one Norwegian fjord to another, and making furtive excursions which ended as soon as any danger approached. She was the last heavy warship left to the German navy by 1944; but for the British, she was too great a threat to be ignored.

Not for Tirpitz the fate of the Bismarck, a brief moment of glory and then a valiant fight against the odds, and she was always unable, apart from the minor affair at Spitzbergen, to use her strength in action because of Hitler's fear of losing capital ships. Her destruction was thus piecemeal and her end has an air of tragic inevitability, for though she sank quickly enough when the Lancaster’s bombs ripped her apart; she had in reality been wasting away for months before that. And yet, some success must be accredited to her. She had brilliantly achieved the aim of a 'fleet in being' by tying down far greater enemy forces. Whilst sea worthy she had presented a permanent threat to the Atlantic and Arctic sea-routes, and a tremendous annoyance to the Royal Navy, which desperately needed to send the battleships and aircraft-carriers of the Home Fleet to more active theatres, yet dare not while Tirpitz floated.

Little wonder, then, that all possible means were used to destroy her and her epitaph, if one is to be written, should be, ‘she could not be left alone’.