Soveraign Power ought in all Common-wealths to be absolute.
So that it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from Reason, and Scripture, that the
Soveraign Power, whether placed in One Man, as in Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as
in Popular, and Aristocraticall Common-wealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined
to make it. And though of so unlimited a Power, men may fancy many evill consequences, yet
the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetuall warre of every man against his
neighbour, are much worse. The condition of man in this life shall never be without
Inconveniences; but there happeneth in no Common-wealth any great Inconvenience, but
what proceeds from the Subjects disobedience, and breach of those Covenants, from which the
Common-wealth hath its being. And whosoever thinking Soveraign Power too great, will seek
to make it lesse; must subject himselfe, to the Power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a
greater.
The greatest objection is, that of the Practise; when men ask, where, and when, such Power
has by Subjects been acknowledged. But one may ask them again, when, or where has there
been a Kingdome long free from Sedition and Civill Warre. In those Nations, whose Common-
wealths have been long-lived, and not been destroyed, but by forraign warre, the Subjects
never did dispute of the Soveraign Power. But howsoever, an argument from the Practise of
men, that have not sifted to the bottom, and with exact reason weighed the causes, and
nature of Common-wealths, and suffer daily those miseries, that proceed from the ignorance
thereof, is invalid. For though in all places of the world, men should lay the foundation of their
houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be. The skill of making,
and maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and
Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on Practise onely: which Rules, neither poor men have the
leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to
find out.
Footnotes
1. Exod. 20. 19.
2. 1 Sam, 8. 11, 12, &c.
3. Verse. 19, &c.
4. 1 Kings 3. 9.
5. 1 Sam. 24. 9.
6. Coll. 3. 20.
7. Verse 22.
8. Math. 23. 2, 3.
9. Tit.3.2.
10. Mat. 21. 2, 3.
11. Gen. 3. 5.
CHAP. XXI.
Of the LIBERTY of Subjects.
Liberty what.
LIBERTY, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition; (by Opposition, I
mean externall Impediments of motion;) and may be applyed no lesse to Irrationall, and
Inanimate creatures, than to Rationall. For whatsoever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot
move, but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some
externall body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further. And so of all living creatures, whilest
they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or chayns; and of the water whilest it is kept in
by banks, or vessels, that otherwise would spread it selfe into a larger space, we use to say,
they are not at Liberty, to move in such manner, as without those externall impediments they
would. But when the impediment of motion, is in the constitution of the thing it selfe, we use
not to say, it wants the Liberty; but the Power to move; as when a stone lyeth still, or a man is
fastned to his bed by sicknesse.
What it is to be Free.
And according to this proper, and generally received meaning of the word, A FREE-MAN, is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will to. But when the words Free, and Liberty, are applyed to any thing but Bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to Motion, is not subject to Impediment: And
therefore, when 'tis said (for example) The way is Free, no Liberty of the way is signified, but
of those that walk in it without stop. And when we say a Guift is Free, there is not meant any
Liberty of the Guift, but of the Giver, that was not bound by any law, or Covenant to give it. So
when we speak Freely, it is not the Liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise then he did. Lastly, from the use of the word Free-will, no Liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination, but the Liberty of the man; which
consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to
doe.
Feare and Liberty consistent.
Feare, and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into the Sea for feare the ship should sink, he doth it neverthelesse very willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will: It
is therefore the action, of one that was free: so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for feare of Imprisonment, which because no body hindred him from detaining, was the action of a man
at liberty. And generally all actions which men doe in Common-wealths, for feare of the law, are actions, which the doers had liberty to omit.
Liberty and Necessity consistent.
Liberty, and Necessity are consistent: As in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the Channel; so likewise in the Actions which men voluntarily doe: which, because they proceed from their will, proceed from liberty; and yet, because every act of mans will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from
another cause, in a continuall chaine, (whose first link is in the hand of God the first of all
causes,) they proceed from necessity. So that to him that could see the connexion of those
causes, the necessity of all mens voluntary actions, would appeare manifest. And therefore
God, that seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth also that the liberty of man in doing what he will, is accompanied with the necessity of doing that which God will, & no more, nor lesse. For though men may do many things, which God does not command, nor is therefore Author of
them; yet they can have no passion, nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite Gods will is
not the cause. And did not his will assure the necessity of mans will, and consequently of all that on mans will dependeth, the liberty of men would be a contradiction, and impediment to
the omnipotence and liberty of God. And this shall suffice, (as to the matter in hand) of that naturall liberty, which only is properly called liberty.
Artificiall Bonds, or Covenants.
But as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves thereby, have made an
Artificiall Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so also have they made Artificiall Chains,
called Civill Lawes, which they themselves, by mutuall covenants, have fastned at one end, to the lips of that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power; and at the
other end to their own Ears. These Bonds in their own nature but weak, may neverthelesse be
made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them.
Liberty of Subjects consisteth in Liberty from covenants.
In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of the Liberty of Subjects. For seeing there is no Common-wealth in the world, wherein there be Rules enough set down, for
the regulating of all the actions, and words of men, (as being a thing impossible:) it followeth
necessarily, that in all kinds of actions, by the laws prætermitted, men have the Liberty, of
doing what their own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves. For if wee
take Liberty in the proper sense, for corporall Liberty; that is to say, freedome from chains,
and prison, it were very absurd for men to clamor as they doe, for the Liberty they so
manifestly enjoy. Againe, if we take Liberty, for an exemption from Lawes, it is no lesse
absurd, for men to demand as they doe, that Liberty, by which all other men may be masters
of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is, this is it they demand; not knowing that the Lawes are
of no power to protect them, without a Sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those
laws to be put in execution. The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only in those things,
which in regulating their actions, the Soveraign hath prætermitted: such as is the Liberty to
buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own aboad, their own
diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; & the like.
Liberty of the Subject consistent with the unlimited power of the Soveraign.
Neverthelesse we are not to understand, that by such Liberty, the Soveraign Power of life, and
death, is either abolished, or limited. For it has been already shewn, that nothing the
Soveraign Representative can doe to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be
called Injustice, or Injury; because every Subject is Author of every act the Soveraign doth; so
that he never wanteth Right to any thing, otherwise, than as he himself is the Subject of God,
and bound thereby to observe the laws of Nature. And therefore it may, and doth often happen
in Common-wealths, that a Subject may be put to death, by the command of the Soveraign
Power; and yet neither doe the other wrong: As when Jeptha caused his daughter to be
sacrificed: In which, and the like cases, he that so dieth, had Liberty to doe the action, for
which he is neverthelesse, without Injury put to death. And the same holdeth also in a
Soveraign Prince, that putteth to death an Innocent Subject. For though the action be against
the law of Nature, as being contrary to Equitie, (as was the killing of Uriah, by David;) yet it was not an Injurie to Uriah; but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to doe what he pleased, was given him by Uriah himself: And yet to God, because David was Gods Subject; and prohibited all Iniquitie by the law of Nature. Which distinction, David himself, when he repented the fact, evidently confirmed, saying, To thee only have I sinned. In the same
manner, the people of Athens, when they banished the most potent of their Common-wealth
for ten years, thought they committed no Injustice; and yet they never questioned what crime
he had done; but what hurt he would doe: Nay they commanded the banishment of they knew
not whom; and every Citizen bringing his Oystershell into the market place, written with the
name of him he desired should be banished, without actuall accusing him, sometimes banished
an Aristides, for his reputation of Justice; And sometimes a scurrilous Jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a Jest of it. And yet a man cannot say, the Soveraign People of Athens wanted right to
banish them; or an Athenian the Libertie to Jest, or to be Just.
The Liberty which writers praise, is the Liberty of Soveraigns; not of Private men.
The Libertie, whereof there is so frequent, and honourable mention, in the Histories, and
Philosophy of the Antient Greeks, and Romans, and in the writings, and discourse of those that
from them have received all their learning in the Politiques, is not the Libertie of Particular
men; but the Libertie of the Common-wealth: which is the same with that, which every man
then should have, if there were no Civil Laws, nor Common-wealth at all. And the effects of it
also be the same. For as amongst masterlesse men, there is perpetuall war, of every man
against his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to the Son, nor to expect from the Father;
no propriety of Goods, or Lands; no security; but a full and absolute Libertie in every Particular
man: So in States, and Common-wealths not dependent on one another, every Common-
wealth, (not every man) has an absolute Libertie, to doe what it shall judge (that is to say,
what that Man, or Assemblie that representeth it, shall judge) most conducing to their benefit.
But withall, they live in the condition of a perpetuall war, and upon the confines of battel, with
their frontiers armed, and canons planted against their neighbours round about. The
Athenians, and Romanes were free; that is, free Common-wealths: not that any particular men had the Libertie to resist their own Representative; but that their Representative had the
Libertie to resist, or invade other people. There is written on the Turrets of the city of Luca in great characters at this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence inferre, that a
particular man has more Libertie, or Immunitie from the service of the Commonwealth there,
than in Constantinople. Whether a Common-wealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the Freedome
is still the same.
But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name of Libertie; and for want
of Judgement to distinguish, mistake that for their Private Inheritance, and Birth right, which is
the right of the Publique only. And when the same errour is confirmed by the authority of men
in reputation for their writings in this subject, it is no wonder if it produce sedition, and change of Government. In these westerne parts of the world, we are made to receive our opinions
concerning the Institution, and Rights of Common-wealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and other
men, Greeks and Romanes, that living under Popular States, derived those Rights, not from
the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them into their books, out of the Practise of their own
Common-wealths, which were Popular; as the Grammarians describe the Rules of Language,
out of the Practise of the time; or the Rules of Poetry, out of the Poems of Homer and Virgil.
And because the Athenians were taught, (to keep them from desire of changing their
Government,) that they were Freemen, and all that lived under Monarchy were slaves;
therefore Aristotle puts it down in his Politiques, ( lib. 6. cap. 2.) In democracy, Liberty is to be supposed: for 'tis commonly held, that no man is Free in any other Government. And as Aristotle; so Cicero, and other Writers have grounded their Civill doctrine, on the opinions of the Romans, who were taught to hate Monarchy, at first, by them that having deposed their
Soveraign, shared amongst them the Soveraignty of Rome; and afterwards by their
Successors. And by reading of these Greek, and Latine Authors, men from their childhood have
gotten a habit (under a false shew of Liberty,) of favouring tumults, and of licentious
controlling the actions of their Soveraigns; and again of controlling those controllers, with the
effusion of so much blood; as I think I may truly say, there was never any thing so deerly
bought, as these Western parts have bought the learning of the Greek and Latine tongues.
Liberty of Subjects how to be measured.
To come now to the particulars of the true Liberty of a Subject; that is to say, what are the
things, which though commanded by the Soveraign, he may neverthelesse, without Injustice,
refuse to do; we are to consider, what Rights we passe away, when we make a Common-
wealth; or (which is all one,) what Liberty we deny our selves, by owning all the Actions
(without exception) of the Man, or Assembly we make our Soveraign. For in the act of our
Submission, consisteth both our Obligation, and our Liberty; which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from thence; there being no Obligation on any man, which ariseth not
from some Act of his own; for all men equally, are by Nature Free. And because such
arguments, must either be drawn from the expresse words, I Authorise all his Actions, or from the Intention of him that submitteth himselfe to his Power, (which Intention is to be
understood by the End for which he so submitteth;) The Obligation, and Liberty of the Subject,
is to be derived, either from those Words, (or others equivalent;) or else from the End of the
Institution of Soveraignty; namely, the Peace of the Subjects within themselves, and their
Defence against a common Enemy.
Subjects have Liberty to defend their own bodies, even against them that lawfully invade
them;
First therefore, seeing Soveraignty by Institution, is by Covenant of every one to every one;
and Soveraignty by Acquisition, by Covenants of the Vanquished to the Victor, or Child to the
Parent; It is manifest, that every Subject has Liberty in all those things, the right whereof
cannot by Covenant be transferred. I have shewn before in the 14. Chapter, that Covenants,
not to defend a mans own body, are voyd. Therefore,
Are not bound to hurt themselves;
If the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned,) to kill, wound, or mayme
himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, ayre,
medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the Liberty to
disobey.
If a man be interrogated by the Soveraign, or his Authority, concerning a crime done by
himselfe, he is not bound (without assurance of Pardon) to confesse it; because no man (as I
have shewn in the same Chapter) can be obliged by Covenant to accuse himselfe.
Again, the Consent of a Subject to Soveraign Power, is contained in these words, I Authorise,
or take upon me, all his actions; in which there is no restriction at all, of his own former naturall Liberty: For by allowing him to kill me, I am not bound to kill my selfe when he
commands me. 'Tis one thing to say, Kill me, or my fellow, if you please; another thing to say, I will kill my selfe, or my fellow. It followeth therefore, that
No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himselfe, or any other man; And
consequently, that the Obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the Command of the
Soveraign to execute any dangerous, or dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the Words of
our Submission; but on the Intention; which is to be understood by the End thereof. When
therefore our refusall to obey, frustrates the End for which the Soveraignty was ordained; then
there is no Liberty to refuse: otherwise there is.
Nor to warfare, unlesse they voluntarily undertake it.
Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight against the enemy, though
his Soveraign have Right enough to punish his refusall with death, may neverthelesse in many
cases refuse, without Injustice; as when he substituteth a sufficient Souldier in his place: for in
this case he deserteth not the service of the Common-wealth. And there is allowance to be
made for naturall timorousnesse, not onely to women, (of whom no such dangerous duty is
expected,) but also to men of feminine courage. When Armies fight, there is on one side, or
both, a running away; yet when they do it not out of trechery, but fear, they are not esteemed
to do it unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same reason, to avoyd battell, is not Injustice, but
Cowardise. But he that inrowleth himselfe a Souldier, or taketh imprest mony, taketh away the
excuse of a timorous nature; and is obliged, not onely to go to the battell, but also not to run
from it, without his Captaines leave. And when the Defence of the Common-wealth, requireth
at once the help of all that are able to bear Arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the
Institution of the Common-wealth, which they have not the purpose, or courage to preserve,
was in vain.
To resist the Sword of the Common-wealth, in defence of another man, guilty, or innocent, no
man hath Liberty; because such Liberty, takes away from the Soveraign, the means of
Protecting us; and is therefore destructive of the very essence of Government. But in case a
great many men together, have already resisted the Soveraign Power unjustly, or committed
some Capitall crime, for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the
Liberty then to joyn together, and assist, and defend one another? Certainly they have: For
they but defend their lives, which the Guilty man may as well do, as the Innocent. There was
indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; Their bearing of Arms subsequent to it,
though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act. And if it be onely to
defend their persons, it is not unjust at all. But the offer of pardon taketh from them, to whom
it is offered, the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting, or defending
the rest, unlawfull.
The Greatest Liberty of Subjects, dependeth on the Silence of the Law.
As for other Lyberties, they depend on the Silence of the Law. In cases where the Soveraign
has prescribed no rule, there the Subject hath the Liberty to do, or forbeare, according to his
own discretion. And therefore such Liberty is in some places more, and in some lesse; and in
some times more, in other times lesse, according as they that have the Soveraignty shall think
most convenient. As for Example, there was a time, when in England a man might enter in to
his own Land, (and dispossesse such as wrongfully possessed it,) by force. But in after-times,
that Liberty of Forcible Entry, was taken away by a Statute made (by the King) in Parliament.
And in some places of the world, men have the Liberty of many wives: in other places, such
Liberty is not allowed.
If a Subject have a controversie with his Soveraigne, of debt, or of right of possession of lands
or goods, or concerning any service required at his hands, or concerning any penalty, corporall,
or pecuniary, grounded on a precedent Law; he hath the same Liberty to sue for his right, as if
it were against a Subject; and before such Judges, as are appointed by the Soveraign. For
seeing the Soveraign demandeth by force of a former Law, and not by vertue of his Power; he
declareth thereby, that he requireth no more, than shall appear to be due by that Law. The
sute therefore is not contrary to the will of the Soveraign; and consequently the Subject hath
the Liberty to demand the hearing of his Cause; and sentence, according to that Law. But if he
demand, or take any thing by pretence of his Power; there lyeth, in that case, no action of
Law: for all that is done by him in Vertue of his Power, is done by the Authority of every
Subject, and consequently, he that brings an action against the Soveraign, brings it against
himselfe.
If a Monarch, or Soveraign Assembly, grant a Liberty to all, or any of his Subjects, which Grant
standing, he is disabled to provide for their safety, the Grant is voyd; unlesse he directly
renounce, or transferre the Soveraignty to another. For in that he might openly, (if it had been
his will,) and in plain termes, have renounced, or transferred it, and did not; it is to be
understood it was not his will; but that the Grant proceeded from ignorance of the repugnancy
between such a Liberty and the Soveraign Power: and therefore the Soveraignty is still
retayned; and consequently all those Powers, which are necessary to the exercising thereof;
such as are the Power of Warre, and Peace, of Judicature, of appointing Officers, and
Councellours, of levying Mony, and the rest named in the 18th Chapter.
In what Cases Subjects are absolved of their obedience to their Soveraign.
The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than
the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. For the right men have by Nature to
protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no Covenant be relinquished.
The Soveraignty is the Soule of the Common-wealth; which once departed from the Body, the
members doe no more receive their motion from it. The end of Obedience is Protection; which,
wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own, or in anothers sword, Nature applyeth his
obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintaine it. And though Soveraignty, in the intention of
them that make it, be immortall; yet is it in its own nature, not only subject to violent death,
by forreign war; but also through the ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in it, from the
very institution, many seeds of a naturall mortality, by Intestine Discord.
In case of Captivity.
If a Subject be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his means of life be within the Guards
of the enemy, and hath his life and corporall Libertie given him, on condition to be Subject to
the Victor, he hath Libertie to accept the condition; and having accepted it, is the subject of
him that took him; because he had no other