choice. If you are a Christian, you will say, Consult a priest; but there are
collaborationists, priests who are resisters and priests who wait for the tide
to turn: which will you choose? Had this young man chosen a priest of the
resistance, or one of the collaboration, he would have decided beforehand
the kind of advice he was to receive. Similarly, in coming to me, he knew
what advice I should give him, and I had but one reply to make. You are
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free, therefore choose that is to say, invent. No rule of general morality
can show you what you ought to do: no signs are vouchsafed in this world.
The Catholics will reply, “Oh, but they are!” Very well; still, it is I myself,
in every case, who have to interpret the signs. While I was imprisoned, I
made the acquaintance of a somewhat remarkable man, a Jesuit, who had
become a member of that order in the following manner. In his life he had
suffered a succession of rather severe setbacks. His father had died when
he was a child, leaving him in poverty, and he had been awarded a free
scholarship in a religious institution, where he had been made continually
to feel that he was accepted for charity’s sake, and, in consequence, he had
been denied several of those distinctions and honours which gratify chil-
dren. Later, about the age of eighteen, he came to grief in a sentimental af-
fair; and finally, at twenty-two—this was a trifle in itself, but it was the last
drop that overflowed his cup—he failed in his military examination. This
young man, then, could regard himself as a total failure: it was a sign—but
a sign of what? He might have taken refuge in bitterness or despair. But
he took it—very cleverly for him—as a sign that he was not intended for
secular success, and that only the attainments of religion, those of sanctity
and of faith, were accessible to him. He interpreted his record as a message
from God, and became a member of the Order. Who can doubt but that this
decision as to the meaning of the sign was his, and his alone? One could
have drawn quite different conclusions from such a series of reverses—as,
for example, that he had better become a carpenter or a revolutionary. For
the decipherment of the sign, however, ho bears the entire responsibility.
That is what “abandonment” implies, that we ourselves decide our being.
And with this abandonment goes anguish.
[Despair]
As for “despair,” the meaning of this expression is extremely simple. It
merely means that we limit ourselves to a reliance upon that which is
within our wills, or within the sum of the probabilities which render our
action feasible. Whenever one wills anything, there are always these ele-
ments of probability. If I am counting upon a visit from a friend, who may
be coming by train or by tram, I presuppose that the train will arrive at the
appointed time, or that the tram will not be derailed. I remain in the realm
of possibilities; but one does not rely upon any possibilities beyond those
that are strictly concerned in one’s action. Beyond the point at which the
possibilities under consideration cease to affect my action, I ought to dis-
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interest myself. For there is no God and no prevenient design, which can
adapt the world and all its possibilities to my will. When Descartes said,
“Conquer yourself rather than the world,” what he meant was, at bottom,
the same—that we should act without hope.. . .
From the reading. . .
“ The doctrine I am presenting before you is precisely the opposite of
this, since it declares that there is no reality except in action. It goes
further, indeed, and adds, ‘Man is nothing else but what he purposes,
he exists only in so far as he realizes himself, he is therefore nothing
else but the sum of his actions, nothing else but what his life is.’”
[You Are What You Live]
Quietism is the attitude of people who say, “Let others do what I cannot
do.” The doctrine I am presenting before you is precisely the opposite of
this, since it declares that there is no reality except in action. It goes further,
indeed, and adds, “Man is nothing else but what he purposes, he exists only
in so far as he realizes himself, he is therefore nothing else but the sum of
his actions, nothing else but what his life is.” Hence we can well under-
stand why some people are horrified by our teaching. For many have but
one resource to sustain them in their misery, and that is to think, “Circum-
stances have been against me, I was worthy to be something much better
than I have been. I admit I have never had a great love or a great friendship;
but that is because I never met a man or a woman who were worthy of it; if
I have not written any very good books, it is because I had not the leisure
to do so; or, if I have had no children to whom X could devote myself it
is because I did not find the man I could have lived with. So there remains
within me a wide range of abilities, inclinations and potentialities, unused
but perfectly viable, which endow me with a worthiness that could never
be inferred from the mere history of my actions.” But in reality and for the
existentialist, there is no love apart from the deeds of love; no potentiality
of love other than that which is manifested in loving; there is no genius
other than that which is expressed in works of art. The genius of Proust
is the totality of the works of Proust; the genius of Racine is the series of
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his tragedies, outside of which there is nothing. Why should we attribute
to Racine the capacity to write yet another tragedy when that is precisely
what he—did not write? In life, a man commits himself, draws his own
portrait and there is nothing but that portrait. No doubt this thought may
seem comfortless to one who has not made a success of his life. On the
other hand, it puts everyone in a position to understand that reality alone
is reliable; that dreams, expectations and hopes serve to define a man only
as deceptive dreams abortive hopes, expectations unfulfilled; that is to say,
they define him negatively, not positively. Nevertheless, when one says,
“You are nothing else but what you live,” it does not imply that an artist
is to be judged solely by his works of art, for a thousand other things con-
tribute no less to his definition as a man. What we mean to say is that
a man is no other than a series of undertakings, that he is the sum, the
organization, the set of relations that constitute these undertakings.. . .
We have now, I think, dealt with a certain number of the reproaches against
existentialism. You have seen that it cannot be regarded as a philosophy of
quietism since it defines man by his action; nor as a pessimistic description
of man, for no doctrine is more optimistic, the destiny of man is placed
within himself. Nor is it an attempt to discourage man from action since it
tells him that there is no hope except in his action, and that the one thing
which permits him to have life is the deed. Upon this level therefore, what
we are considering is an ethic of action and self-commitment. However,
we are still reproached, upon these few data, for confining man within his
individual subjectivity. There again people badly misunderstand us.
[Subjectivity]
Our point of departure is, indeed, the subjectivity of the individual, and
that for strictly philosophic reasons. It is not because we are bourgeois,
but because we seek to base our teaching upon the truth, and not upon a
collection of fine theories, full of hope but lacking real foundations. And
at the point of departure there cannot be any other truth than this, I think,
therefore I am, which is the absolute truth of consciousness as it attains
to itself. Every theory which begins with man, outside of this moment of
self-attainment, is a theory which thereby suppresses the truth, for outside
of the Cartesian cogito, all objects are no more than probable, and any
doctrine of probabilities which is not attached to a truth will crumble into
nothing. In order to define the probable one must possess the true. Before
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there can be any truth whatever, then, there must be an absolute truth, and
there is such a truth which is simple, easily attained and within the reach
of everybody; it consists in one’s immediate sense of one’s self.
[Intersubjectivity]
In the second place, this theory alone is compatible with the dignity of
man, it is the only one which does not make man into an object. All kinds
of materialism lead one to treat every man including oneself as an ob-
ject—that is, as a set of pre-determined reactions, in no way different from
the patterns of qualities and phenomena which constitute a table, or a chair
or a stone. Our aim is precisely to establish the human kingdom as a pat-
tern of values in distinction from the material world. But the subjectivity
which we thus postulate as the standard of truth is no narrowly individual
subjectivism, for as we have demonstrated, it is not only one’s own self
that one discovers in the cogito, but those of others too. Contrary to the
philosophy of Descartes, contrary to that of Kant, when we say "I think"
we are attaining to ourselves in the presence of the other, and we are just
as certain of the other as we are of ourselves. Thus the man who discovers
himself directly in the cogito also discovers all the others, and discovers
them as the condition of his own existence. He recognizes that he cannot
be anything (in the sense in which one says one is spiritual, or that one is
wicked or jealous) unless others recognize him as such. I cannot obtain any
truth whatsoever about myself, except through the mediation of another.
The other is indispensable to my existence, and equally so to any knowl-
edge I can have of myself. Under these conditions, the intimate discovery
of myself is at the same time the revelation of the other as a freedom which
confronts mine. and which cannot think or will without doing so either for
or against me. Thus, at once, we find ourselves in a world which is, let us
say, that of “inter-subjectivity” It is in this world that man has to decide
what he is and what others are.
[Human Condition]
Furthermore, although it is impossible to find in each and every man a
universal essence that can be called human nature, there is nevertheless a
human universality of condition. It is not by chance that the thinkers of
today are so much more ready to speak of the condition than of the nature
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of man. By his condition they understand, with more or less clarity, all
the limitations which à priori define man’s fundamental situation in the
universe. His historical situations are variable: man may be born a slave in
a pagan society or may be a feudal baron, or a proletarian. But what never
vary are the necessities of being in the world, of having to labor and to die
there. These limitations are neither subjective nor objective, or rather there
is both a subjective and an objective aspect of them. Objective, because
we meet with them everywhere and they are everywhere recognizable:
and subjective because they are lived and are nothing if man does not
live them—if, that is to say, he does not freely determine himself and his
existence in relation to them. And, diverse though man’s purpose may be,
at least none of them is wholly foreign to me, since every human purpose
presents itself as an attempt either to surpass these limitations, or to widen
them, or else to deny or to accommodate oneself to them. Consequently
every purpose, however individual it may be, is of universal value. Every
purpose, even that of a Chinese, an Indian or a Negro, can be understood
by a European. To say it can be understood, means that the European of
1945 may be striving out of a certain situation towards the same limitations
in the same way, and that he may reconceive in himself the purpose of the
Chinese, of the Indian or the African. In every purpose there is universality,
in this sense that every purpose is comprehensible to every man. Not that
this or that purpose defines man for ever, but that it may be entertained
again and again. There is always some way of understanding an idiot,
a child, a primitive man or a foreigner if one has sufficient information.
In this sense we may say that there is a human universality, but it is not
something given; it is being perpetually made. I make this universality in
choosing myself; I also make it by understanding the purpose of any other
man, of whatever epoch. This absoluteness of the act of choice does not
alter the relativity of each epoch.
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Paris, France, Refugee Camp WW II, Library of Congress
What is at the very heart and center of existentialism, is the absolute char-
acter of the free commitment, by which every man realizes himself in re-
alizing a type of humanity—a commitment always understandable, to no
matter whom in no matter what epoch—and its bearing upon the relativity
of the cultural pattern which may result from such absolute commitment.
One must observe equally the relativity of Cartesianism and the absolute
character of the Cartesian commitment. In this sense you may say, if you
like, that every one of us makes the absolute by breathing, by eating, by
sleeping or by behaving in any fashion whatsoever. There is no differ-
ence between free being—being as self-committal, as existence choosing
its essence—and absolute being. And there is no difference whatever be-
tween being as an absolute, temporarily localized that is, localized in his-
tory—and universally intelligible being.
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From the reading. . .
“What is at the very heart and center of existentialism, is the absolute
character of the free commitment, by which every man realizes himself
in realizing a type of humanity. . . ”
[Moral Choice]
This does not completely refute the charge of subjectivism Indeed that
objection appears in several other forms, of which the first is as follows.
People say to us, “Then it does not matter what you do,” and they say this
in various ways. First they tax us with anarchy; then they say, “You cannot
judge others, for there is no reason for preferring one purpose to another;”
finally, they may say, “Everything being merely voluntary in this choice
of yours, you give away with one hand what you pretend to gain with the
other.” These three are not very serious objections. As to the first, to say
that it does not matter what you choose is not correct. In one sense choice
is possible, but what is not possible is not to choose. I can always choose,
but I must know that if I do not choose, that is still a choice. This, although
it may appear merely formal, is of great importance as a limit to fantasy
and caprice. For, when I confront a real situation—for example, that I am
a sexual being, able to have relations with a being of the other sex and able
to have children—I am obliged to choose my attitude to it, and in every
respect I bear the responsibility of the choice which, in committing myself,
also commits the whole of humanity. Even if my choice is determined by
no à priori value whatever, it can have nothing to do with caprice: and if
anyone thinks that this is only Gide’s theory of the acte gratuit over again,
he has failed to see the enormous difference between this theory and that
of Gide. Gide does not know what a situation is, his “act” is one of pure
caprice. In our view, on the contrary, man finds himself in an organized
situation in which he is himself involved: his choice involves mankind in
its entirety, and he cannot avoid choosing. Either he must remain single,
or he must marry without having children, or he must marry and have
children. In any case, and whichever—he may choose, it is impossible
for him, in respect of this situation, not to take complete responsibility.
Doubtless he chooses without reference to any pre-established value, but
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it is unjust to tax him with caprice. Rather let us say that the moral choice
is comparable to the construction of a work of art.
But here I must at once digress to make it quite clear that we are not
propounding an æsthetic morality, for our adversaries are disingenuous
enough to reproach us even with that. I mention the work of art only by
way of comparison. That being understood, does anyone reproach an artist,
when he paints a picture, for not following rules established à priori? Does
one ever ask what is the picture that he ought to paint? As everyone knows,
there is no pre-defined picture for him to make; the artist applies himself
to the composition of a picture, and the picture that ought to be made is
precisely that which he will have made. As everyone knows, there are no
æsthetic values à priori, but there are values which will appear in due
course in the coherence of the picture, in the relation between the will to
create and the finished work. No one can tell what the painting of tomor-
row will be like; one cannot judge a painting until it is done. What has
that to do with morality? We are in the same creative situation. We never
speak of a work of art as irresponsible; when we are discussing a canvas
by Picasso, we understand very well that the composition became what
it is at the time when he was painting it, and that his works are part and
parcel of his entire life.
It is the same upon the plane of morality. There is this in common between
art and morality, that in both we have to do with creation and invention.
We cannot decide à priori what it is that should be done. I think it was
made sufficiently clear to you in the case of that student who came to
see me, that to whatever ethical system he might appeal, the Kantian or
any other, he could find no sort of guidance whatever; he was obliged
to invent the law for himself. Certainly we cannot say that this man, in
choosing to remain with his mother—that is, in taking sentiment, personal
devotion and concrete charity as his moral foundations—would be making
an irresponsible choice, nor could we do so if he preferred the sacrifice of
going away to England. Man makes himself; he is not found ready-made;
he makes himself by the choice of his morality, and he cannot but choose
a morality, such is the pressure of circumstances upon him. We define man
only in relation to his commitments; it is therefore absurd to reproach us
for irresponsibility in our choice.
In the second place, people say to us, “You are unable to judge others.”
This is true in one sense and false in another. It is true in this sense, that
whenever a man chooses his purpose and his commitment in all clearness
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and in all sincerity, whatever that purpose may be, it is impossible for him
to prefer another. It is true in the sense that we do not believe in progress.
Progress implies amelioration; but man is always the same, facing a situa-
tion which is always changing. and choice remains always a choice in the
situation. The moral problem has not changed since the time when it was
a choice between slavery and anti-slavery. . .
[Authenticity and Self-Deception]
We can judge, nevertheless, for, as I have said, one chooses in view of oth-
ers, and in view of others one chooses himself. One can judge, first—and
perhaps this is not a judgment of value, but it is a logical judgment—that
in certain cases choice is founded upon an error, and in others upon the
truth. One can judge a man by saying that he deceives himself. Since we
have defined the situation of man as one of free choice, without excuse and
without help, any man who takes refuge behind the excuse of his passions,
or by inventing some deterministic doctrine, is a self-deceiver. One may
object: “But why should he not choose to deceive himself?” I reply that
it is not for me to judge him morally, but I define his self-deception as an
error. Here one cannot avoid pronouncing a judgment of truth. The self-
deception is evidently a falsehood, because it is a dissimulation of man’s
complete liberty of commitment. Upon this same level, I say that it is also a
self-deception if I choose to declare that certain values are incumbent upon
me; I am in contradiction with myself if I will these values and at the same
time say that they impose themselves upon me. If anyone says to me, “And
what if I wish to deceive myself?” I answer, “There is no reason why you
should not, but I declare that you are doing so, and that the attitude of strict
consistency alone is that of good faith.” Furthermore, I can pronounce a
moral judgment. For I declare that freedom, in respect of concrete circum-
stances, can have no other end and aim but itself; and when once a man
has seen that values depend upon himself, in that state of forsakenness he
can will only one thing, and that is freedom as the foundation of all val-
ues. That does not mean that he wills it in the abstract: it simply means
that the actions of men of good faith have, as their ultimate significance,
the quest of freedom itself as such. A man who belongs to some commu-
nist or revolutionary society wills certain concrete ends, which imply the
will to freedom, but that freedom is willed in community. We will freedom
for freedom’s sake, in and through particular circumstances. And in thus
willing freedom, we discover that it depends entirely upon the freedom of
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others and that the freedom of others depends upon our own. Obviously,
freedom as the definition of a man does not depend upon others, but as
soon as there is a commitment, I am obliged to will the liberty of others at
the same time as my own. I cannot make liberty my aim unless I make that
of others equally my aim. Consequently, when I recognize, as entirely au-
thentic, that man is a being whose existence precedes his essence, and that
he is a free being who cannot, in any circumstances, but will his freedom,
at the same time I realize that I cannot not will the freedom of others. Thus,
in the name of that will to freedom which is implied in freedom itself, I can
form judgments upon those who seek to hide from themselves the wholly
voluntary nature of their existence and its complete freedom. Those who
hide from this total freed