Studies in the psychology of sex, volume VI. Sex in Relation to Society by Havelock Ellis. - HTML preview

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Alexandrian period,

and notably in Asclepiades, Benecke maintains, that

the love of

women was regarded as a matter of life and death.

Thereafter the

conception of sexual love, in its romantic aspects,

appears in

European life. With the Celtic story of Tristram, as

Gaston Paris

remarks, it finally appears in the Christian

European world of

poetry as the chief point in human life, the great

motive force

of conduct.

Romantic love failed, however, to penetrate the

masses in Europe.

In the sixteenth century, or whenever it was that

the ballad of

"Glasgerion" was written, we see it is assumed that a churl's

relation to his mistress is confined to the mere act

of sexual

intercourse; he fails to kiss her on arriving or

departing; it is

only the knight, the man of upper class, who would

think of

offering that tender civility. And at the present

day in, for

instance, the region between East Friesland and the

Alps, Bloch

states (_Sexualleben unserer Zeit_, p. 29),

following E.H. Meyer,

that the word "love" is unknown among the masses, and only its

coarse counterpart recognized.

On the other side of the world, in Japan, sexual

love seems to be

in as great disrepute as it was in ancient Greece;

thus Miss

Tsuda, a Japanese head-mistress, and herself a

Christian, remarks

(as quoted by Mrs. Eraser in _World's Work and

Play_, Dec.,

1906): "That word 'love' has been hitherto a word unknown among

our girls, in the foreign sense. Duty, submission,

kindness--these were the sentiments which a girl was

expected to

bring to the husband who had been chosen for her--

and many happy,

harmonious marriages were the result. Now, your dear

sentimental

foreign women say to our girls: 'It is wicked to

marry without

love; the obedience to parents in such a case is an

outrage

against nature and Christianity. If you love a man

you must

sacrifice everything to marry him.'"

When, however, love is fully developed it becomes an

enormously

extended, highly complex emotion, and lust, even in

the best

sense of that word, becomes merely a coördinated

element among

many other elements. Herbert Spencer, in an

interesting passage

of his _Principles of Psychology_ (Part IV, Ch.

VIII), has

analyzed love into as many as nine distinct and

important

elements: (1) the physical impulse of sex; (2) the

feeling for

beauty; (3) affection; (4) admiration and respect;

(5) love of

approbation; (6) self-esteem; (7) proprietary

feeling; (8)

extended liberty of action from the absence of

personal barriers;

(9) exaltation of the sympathies. "This passion," he concludes,

"fuses into one immense aggregate most of the

elementary

excitations of which we are capable."

It is scarcely necessary to say that to define sexual

love, or even to

analyze its components, is by no means to explain its

mystery. We seek to

satisfy our intelligence by means of a coherent picture of love, but the

gulf between that picture and the emotional reality must always be

incommensurable and impassable. "There is no word more often pronounced

than that of love," wrote Bonstetten many years ago,

"yet there is no

subject more mysterious. Of that which touches us most nearly we know

least. We measure the march of the stars and we do not know how we love."

And however expert we have become in detecting and

analyzing the causes,

the concomitants, and the results of love, we must still make the same

confession to-day. We may, as some have done, attempt to explain love as a

form of hunger and thirst, or as a force analogous to

electricity, or as a

kind of magnetism, or as a variety of chemical affinity, or as a vital

tropism, but these explanations are nothing more than

ways of expressing

to ourselves the magnitude of the phenomenon we are in the presence of.

What has always baffled men in the contemplation of

sexual love is the

seeming inadequacy of its cause, the immense discrepancy between the

necessarily circumscribed region of mucous membrane

which is the final

goal of such love and the sea of world-embracing

emotions to which it

seems as the door, so that, as Remy de Gourmont has

said, "the mucous

membranes, by an ineffable mystery, enclose in their

obscure folds all the

riches of the infinite." It is a mystery before which the thinker and the

artist are alike overcome. Donnay, in his play

_L'Escalade_, makes a cold

and stern man of science, who regards love as a mere

mental disorder which

can be cured like other disorders, at last fall

desperately in love

himself. He forces his way into the girl's room, by a

ladder, at dead of

night, and breaks into a long and passionate speech:

"Everything that

touches you becomes to me mysterious and sacred. Ah! to think that a thing

so well known as a woman's body, which sculptors have

modelled, which

poets have sung of, which men of science like myself

have dissected, that

such a thing should suddenly become an unknown mystery and an infinite joy

merely because it is the body of one particular woman--

what insanity! And

yet that is what I feel."[64]

That love is a natural insanity, a temporary delusion

which the individual

is compelled to suffer for the sake of the race, is

indeed an explanation

that has suggested itself to many who have been baffled by this mystery.

That, as we know, was the explanation offered by

Schopenhauer. When a

youth and a girl fall into each other's arms in the

ecstacy of love they

imagine that they are seeking their own happiness. But it is not so, said

Schopenhauer; they are deluded by the genius of the race into the belief

that they are seeking a personal end in order that they may be induced to

effect a far greater impersonal end: the creation of the future race. The

intensity of their passion is not the measure of the

personal happiness

they will secure but the measure of their aptitude for producing

offspring. In accepting passion and renouncing the

counsels of cautious

prudence the youth and the girl are really sacrificing their chances of

selfish happiness and fulfilling the larger ends of

Nature. As

Schopenhauer saw the matter, there was here no vulgar

illusion. The lovers

thought that they were reaching towards a boundlessly

immense personal

happiness; they were probably deceived. But they were

deceived not because

the reality was less than their imagination, but because it was more;

instead of pursuing, as they thought, a merely personal end they were

carrying on the creative work of the world, a task

better left undone, as

Schopenhauer viewed it, but a task whose magnitude he

fully

recognized.[65]

It must be remembered that in the lower sense of

deception, love may be,

and frequently is, a delusion. A man may deceive

himself, or be deceived

by the object of his attraction, concerning the

qualities that she

possesses or fails to possess. In first love, occurring in youth, such

deception is perhaps entirely normal, and in certain

suggestible and

inflammable types of people it is peculiarly apt to

occur. This kind of

deception, although far more frequent and conspicuous in matters of

love--and more serious because of the tightness of the marriage bond--is

liable to occur in any relation of life. For most

people, however, and

those not the least sane or the least wise, the memory of the exaltation

of love, even when the period of that exaltation is

over, still remains

as, at the least, the memory of one of the most real and essential facts

of life.[66]

Some writers seem to confuse the liability in

matters of love to

deception or disappointment with the larger question

of a

metaphysical illusion in Schopenhauer's sense. To

some extent

this confusion perhaps exists in the discussion of

love by

Renouvier and Prat in _La Nouvelle Monadologie_ (pp.

216 _et

seq._). In considering whether love is or is not a

delusion, they

answer that it is or is not according as we are, or

are not,

dominated by selfishness and injustice. "It was not an essential

error which presided over the creation of the

_idol_, for the

idol is only what in all things the _ideal_ is. But

to realize

the ideal in love two persons are needed, and

therein is the

great difficulty. We are never justified," they

conclude, "in

casting contempt on our love, or even on its object,

for if it is

true that we have not gained possession of the

sovereign beauty

of the world it is equally true that we have not

attained a

degree of perfection that would have entitled us

justly to claim

so great a prize." And perhaps most of us, it may be added, must

admit in the end, if we are honest with ourselves,

that the

prizes of love we have gained in the world, whatever

their flaws,

are far greater than we deserved.

We may well agree that in a certain sense not love alone but all the

passions and desires of men are illusions. In that sense the Gospel of

Buddha is justified, and we may recognize the

inspiration of Shakespeare

(in the _Tempest_) and of Calderon (in _La Vida es

Sueño_), who felt that

ultimately the whole world is an insubstantial dream.

But short of that

large and ultimate vision we cannot accept illusion; we cannot admit that

love is a delusion in some special and peculiar sense

that men's other

cravings and aspirations escape. On the contrary, it is the most solid of

realities. All the progressive forms of life are built up on the

attraction of sex. If we admit the action of sexual

selection--as we can

scarcely fail to do if we purge it from its unessential accretions[67]--love has moulded the precise shape and color, the

essential beauty, alike of animal and human life.

If we further reflect that, as many investigators

believe, not only the

physical structure of life but also its spiritual

structure--our social

feelings, our morality, our religion, our poetry and

art--are, in some

degree at least, also built up on the impulse of sex,

and would have been,

if not non-existent, certainly altogether different had other than sexual

methods of propagation prevailed in the world, we may

easily realize that

we can only fall into confusion by dismissing love as a delusion. The

whole edifice of life topples down, for as the idealist Schiller long

since said, it is entirely built up on hunger and on

love. To look upon

love as in any special sense a delusion is merely to

fall into the trap of

a shallow cynicism. Love is only a delusion in so far as the whole of life

is a delusion, and if we accept the fact of life it is unphilosophical to

refuse to accept the fact of love.

It is unnecessary here to magnify the functions of

love in the

world; it is sufficient to investigate its workings

in its own

proper sphere. It may, however, be worth while to

quote a few

expressions of thinkers, belonging to various

schools, who have

pointed out what seemed to them the far-ranging

significance of

the sexual emotions for the moral life. "The

passions are the

heavenly fire which gives life to the moral world,"

wrote

Helvétius long since in _De l'Esprit_. "The activity of the mind

depends on the activity of the passions, and it is

at the period

of the passions, from the age of twenty-five to

thirty-five or

forty that men are capable of the greatest efforts

of virtue or

of genius." "What touches sex," wrote Zola, "touches the centre

of social life." Even our regard for the praise and blame of

others has a sexual origin, Professor Thomas argues

(_Psychological Review_, Jan., 1904, pp. 61-67), and

it is love

which is the source of susceptibility generally and

of the

altruistic side of life. "The appearance of sex,"

Professor Woods

Hutchinson attempts to show ("Love as a Factor in Evolution,"

_Monist_, 1898), "the development of maleness and femaleness, was

not only the birthplace of affection, the well-

spring of all

morality, but an enormous economic advantage to the

race and an

absolute necessity of progress. In it first we find

any conscious

longing for or active impulse toward a fellow

creature." "Were

man robbed of the instinct of procreation, and of

all that

spiritually springs therefrom," exclaimed Maudsley in his

_Physiology of Mind_, "that moment would all poetry, and perhaps

also his whole moral sense, be obliterated from his

life." "One

seems to oneself transfigured, stronger, richer,

more complete;

one _is_ more complete," says Nietzsche (_Der Wille zur Macht_,

p. 389), "we find here art as an organic function: we find it

inlaid in the most angelic instinct of 'love:' we

find it as the

greatest stimulant of life.... It is not merely that

it changes

the feeling of values: the lover _is_ worth more, is

stronger. In

animals this condition produces new weapons,

pigments, colors,

and forms, above all new movements, new rhythms, a

new seductive

music. It is not otherwise in man.... Even in art

the door is

opened to him. If we subtract from lyrical work in

words and

sounds the suggestions of that intestinal fever,

what is left

over in poetry and music? _L'Art pour l'art_

perhaps, the

quacking virtuosity of cold frogs who perish in

their marsh. All

the rest is created by love."

It would be easy to multiply citations tending to

show how many

diverse thinkers have come to the conclusion that

sexual love

(including therewith parental and especially

maternal love) is

the source of the chief manifestations of life. How

far they are

justified in that conclusion, it is not our business

now to

inquire.

It is undoubtedly true that, as we have seen when

discussing the erratic

and imperfect distribution of the conception of love,

and even of words

for love, over the world, by no means all people are

equally apt for

experiencing, even at any time in their lives, the

emotions of sexual

exaltation. The difference between the knight and the

churl still

subsists, and both may sometimes be found in all social strata. Even the

refinements of sexual enjoyment, it is unnecessary to

insist, quite

commonly remain on a merely physical basis, and have

little effect on the

intellectual and emotional nature.[68] But this is not the case with the

people who have most powerfully influenced the course of the world's

thought and feeling. The personal reality of love, its importance for the

individual life, are facts that have been testified to by some of the

greatest thinkers, after lives devoted to the attainment of intellectual

labor. The experience of Renan, who toward the end of

his life set down in

his remarkable drama _L'Abbesse de Jouarre_, his

conviction that, even

from the point of view of chastity, love is, after all, the supreme thing

in the world, is far from standing alone. "Love has always appeared as an

inferior mode of human music, ambition as the superior mode," wrote Tarde,

the distinguished sociologist, at the end of his life.

"But will it always

be thus? Are there not reasons for thinking that the

future perhaps

reserves for us the ineffable surprise of an inversion of that secular

order?" Laplace, half an hour before his death, took up a volume of his

own _Mécanique Celeste_, and said: "All that is only trifles, there is

nothing true but love." Comte, who had spent his life in building up a

Positive Philosophy which should be absolutely real,

found (as indeed it

may be said the great English Positivist Mill also

found) the culmination

of all his ideals in a woman, who was, he said, Egeria and Beatrice and

Laura in one, and he wrote: "There is nothing real in the world but love.

One grows tired of thinking, and even of acting; one

never grows tired of

loving, nor of saying so. In the worst tortures of

affection I have never

ceased to feel that the essential of happiness is that the heart should be

worthily filled--even with pain, yes, even with pain,

the bitterest pain."

And Sophie Kowalewsky, after intellectual achievements which have placed

her among the most distinguished of her sex,

pathetically wrote: "Why can

no one love me? I could give more than most women, and yet the most

insignificant women are loved and I am not." Love, they all seem to say,

is the one thing that is supremely worth while. The

greatest and most

brilliant of the world's intellectual giants, in their moments of final

insight, thus reach the habitual level of the humble and almost anonymous

persons, cloistered from the world, who wrote _The

Imitation of Christ_ or

_The Letters of a Portuguese Nun_. And how many others!

FOOTNOTES:

[45] _Meditationes Piissimæ de Cognitione Humanæ

Conditionis_, Migne's

_Patrologia_, vol. clxxiv, p. 489, cap. III, "De

Dignitate Animæ et

Vilitate Corporis." It may be worth while to quote more at length the

vigorous language of the original. "Si diligenter consideres quid per os

et nares cæterosque corporis meatus egrediatur, vilius sterquilinum

numquam vidisti.... Attende, homo, quid fuisti ante

ortum, et quid es ab

ortu usque ad occasum, atque quid eris post hanc vitam.

Profecto fuit

quand non eras: postea de vili materia factus, et

vilissimo panno

involutus, menstruali sanguine in utero materno fuisti nutritus, et tunica

tua fuit pellis secundina. Nihil aliud est homo quam

sperma fetidum,

saccus stercorum, cibus vermium.... Quid superbis,

pulvis et cinis, cujus

conceptus cula, nasci miseria, vivere poena, mori

angustia?"

[46] See (in Mignes' edition) _S. Odonis abbatis

Cluniacensis

Collationes_, lib. ii, cap. IX.

[47] Dühren (_Neue Forshungen über die Marquis de Sade_, pp. 432 et seq.)

shows how the ascetic view of woman's body persisted,

for instance, in

Schopenhauer and De Sade.

[48] In "The Evolution of Modesty," in the first volume of these

_Studies_, and again in the fifth volume in discussing urolagnia in the

study of "Erotic Symbolism," the mutual reactions of the sexual and

excretory centres were fully dealt with.

[49] "La Morale Sexuelle," _Archives d'Anthropologie Criminelle_, Jan.,

1907.

[50] The above passage, now slightly modified,

originally formed an

unpublished part of an essay on Walt Whitman in _The New Spirit_, first

issued in 1889.

[51] Even in the ninth century, however, when the

monastic movement was

rapidly developing, there were some who withstood the

tendencies of the

new ascetics. Thus, in 850, Ratramnus, the monk of

Corbie, wrote a

treatise (_Liber de eo quod Christus ex Virgine natus

est_) to prove that

Mary really gave birth to Jesus through her sexual

organs, and not, as

some high-strung persons were beginning to think could alone be possible,

through the more conventionally decent breasts. The

sexual organs were

sanctified. "Spiritus sanctus ... et thalamum tanto dignum sponso

sanctificavit et portam" (Achery, _Spicilegium_, vol. i, p. 55).

[52] _Pædagogus_, lib. ii, cap. X. Elsewhere (id., lib.

ii, Ch. VI) he

makes a more detailed statement to the same effect.

[53] See, e.g., Wilhelm Capitaine, _Die Moral des

Clemens von

Alexandrien_, pp. 112 et seq.

[54] _De Civitate Dei_, lib. xxii, cap. XXIV. "There is no need," he says

again (id., lib. xiv, cap. V) "that in our sins and vices we accuse the

nature of the flesh to the injury of the Creator, for in its own kind and

degree the flesh is good."

[55] St. Augustine, _De Civitate Dei_, lib. xiv, cap.

XXIII-XXVI.

Chrysostom and Gregory, of Nyssa, thought that in

Paradise human beings

would have multiplied by special creation, but such is not the accepted

Catholic doctrine.

[56] W. Capitaine, _Die Moral des Clemens von

Alexandrien_, pp. 112 et

seq. Without the body, Tertullian declared, there could be no virginity

and no salvation. The soul itself is corporeal. He

carries, indeed, his

idea of the omnipresence of the body to the absurd.

[57] Rufinus, _Commentarius in Symbolum Apostolorum_,

cap. XII.

[58] Migne, _Patrologia Græca_, vol. xxvi, pp. 1170 et seq.

[59] Even in physical conformation the human sexual

organs, when compared

with those of the lower animals, show marked differences (see "The

Mechanism of Detumescence," in the fifth volume of these _Studies_).

[60] It may perhaps be as well to point out, with Forel (_Die Sexuelle

Frage_, p. 208), that the word "bestial" is gen