Chapter 7 – Realism of Sri Madhwacharya
Reality is existence in Space and Time
In contradistinction with Advaita. which regards the world as Mithya or Anirvachaniya Sri Madhwacharya holds the world to be real in the fullest sense of the term. His is a dynamic Realism, which confers significance on the world and evokes response in the sentient beings towards action and fulfillment. Realism holds that the objects of true knowledge exist 'out there' in the world having co-ordinates in space and time. The objects exist independently of the perceiving mind and are 'out there’ whether there be a perceiving mind or not. What is directly known in sensory experience is in no sense dependent upon the mind of the knower. Knowledge may be evanescent or transient, but the objects of Knowledge need not necessarily be so. The objects act upon our senses of perception and generate Knowledge. Objects pre-exist perception. In perception the knowing mind makes contact with something other than itself (except in the case of self- knowledge) and knowing is thus a two-term process in which something other than the mind is revealed to the mind. The world revealed to us in true knowledge is real. Now what do we mean by real? The only meaning we can attach to the term is existence in space and time'. When I say that I have a real rose before me I mean nothing more or nothing less than that in front of me there is a rose at this moment. In this sense the rose is real. The essence of reality consists, in the entity of which reality is affirmed, in having specified co-ordinates of space and time. What does not exist in space and time cannot be real and is unreal. In the case of the illusion of the snake in rope, the snake is unreal because it does not exist at the time of perception in the place occupied by the rope. Hence it is unreal. Sri Madhwacharya regards the world as real in the sense that the world exists in space and time. Such realism is a necessary corollary to his epistemological position. Sri Madhwacharya defines pramana as the means of revealing an object as it is. Now how can an object be revealed as it is unless it be real? Only if the object is real, i.e., only if the object exists in space and time, can we know the object to be as it is and can distinguish a knowledge relating to it to be as it is or to appear as it is not. When what I experience or observe as a piece of silver is a piece of silver the knowledge is said to be true and if it is a piece of shell the knowledge is said to be false. Now for the knowledge to be true the object before me must be silver i.e., the object before me (in space) and now (in time) must exist as silver. True knowledge therefore presupposes the existence of objects in space and time and thus Realism as the expression of existence in space and time as an inevitable corollary to the epistemological stand of Sri Madhwacharya. Reality of objects therefore consists in their existing at some place at some time. When it is impossible to say that an object existed at some time at some place the object is said to be unreal. Nowhere on earth at any time in the history of the world did any human being possess horns. Horns, however, may be real as the horns of a cow, but horns of a human being are unreal. The world though dependent on God exists in ‘space’ and ‘time’ and is therefore real. The existence of the world is due to Gods will, but that it exists at all is all that is required for it to be called real. Dependent or independent an entity may be, if it exists in space and time, it is real. God exists everywhere at all times; He is also real. In the matter of existence in space and time there is no doubt about some difference between God and the world. For God exists in all time and space whereas the world does not. Any distinction in reality, as such between God and the world would cut asunder the metaphysical stand of Sri Madhwacharya and such distinction would annihilate the distinguishing feature of his system.
Sri Madhwacharya’s stand is the metaphysical opposite of Advaita and if he did not successfully demonstrate another existent, which is as real as Brahman and different from Him in essence, the advent of his system in the realm of Indian metaphysics could not have been of much significance. Statements are to be found in abundance in the Dvaita literature, which declare that the world is as real as Brahman through dependent on Him (‘yadrisam Brahmanah satvam tadrisam jagtastvapi').
Sri Madhwacharya defines real as abadhya (unsublated). Whatever is unsublated is real i.e., it exists in space and time. When 1 apprehend a snake as a snake my knowledge of the snake is not contradicted or sublated when I go near and observe the snake. But I can see the snake when I go near only if the snake is there before me (in space) and now (in time) when I go near. The non-contradiction of my original knowledge of the snake is due to the existence of the snake in space and time. If, however, when I went near what had appeared as a snake, I saw a rope existing in space and time my original apprehension would become false knowledge. What is not falsified is real and we realize in experience as real those that are not falsified by later knowledge. This definition of real as abadhya as given by Sri Madhwacharya is consistent with experience. Whenever I see an object my further reactions are based on the belief that the object exists ‘out there' and ‘now'. Along with the perception of the object I am aware of the object as existing and if I attempt to grasp the object it is because I believe the object exists when it is presented in experience. Whenever I apprehend an object, I apprehend it as being ‘out there’ 'now' and the spatial and temporal elements are also the true deliverances of perception. When I mistake a piece of shell for silver and try to grasp the silver so presented in my perception, I realize the non- existence of silver and the existence of shell. This later knowledge sublates the prior one. What is never sublated or has no ingredient or potency for sublation is real. Reality is thus a matter of experience and objects are given is real i.e., existing in space and time in experience. The distinction between real and illusory cannot be other than 'being unsublated' and 'being sublated. What I see through my window at dead of night as the face of a thief to be real. I want to know whether the face of the thief existed near the window (in space) and at dead of night (in time). If his face had the co-ordinates of space and time as my window and dead of night respectively, the thief was real. Reality of objects is thus experienced in space and time. Unreality or Illusoriness is non-existence in space and time. It is however not necessary that to be 'real' an object should exist at all time. Only eternal objects exist at all times and non-eternal objects exist at some time or other. An evanescent thing like a lightning is as real as my 'self’ although the former is only transient and the latter enduring. Whatever has co-ordinates in space and time is real. Reality has therefore been succinctly defined as 'traikallkanishedha-apratiyogitvam' i.e., as that relative to which it is impossible to predicate negation in time co-ordinate past, present and future.
Arthakriyakaritva
We can always distinguish between a real thing and an unreal thing in a practical way. This is afforded by what is called the capacity to produce effects in the shape of realized ends (arthakriyakaritva) possessed by real objects. A real object can always produce appropriate effects. A Lightning is real because it can produce effects such as striking a building or lighting the way to a lost traveler in the night. Unreal objects cannot produce such effects. We cannot make ornaments out of the silver perceived in the shell in an illusion. When we mistake a rope for a snake fear is produced in us. It would appear that the unreal snake produced the effect of fear. But it is not the snake that produces fear. The knowledge is real in the sense that it Is produced, and this real knowledge produces fear and not the unreal snake. To a person who has not heard or known of a snake as dangerous, seeing a snake does not produce fear. It is seeing the snake together with the prior knowledge of the snake as dangerous that produces fear. Whether a snake exists or not fear is produced by the knowledge, which has snake as its content. In all cases in experience, it will be found without exception, that the capacity to produce effects is the test of reality. Sri Madhwacharya says ‘badhyam narthakriyakari’ (A.V. p. 16). Whatever is sublated cannot produce effects. Therefore, when Sri Madhwacharya says the world is real, he means the world we experience every moment of our existence, exists in space and time and produces corresponding or appropriate effects which have a profound influence on us. ‘Life Is real and life is earnest' as the poet has said. Now the statement that the world is real does not require as much demonstration as the statement affirming the unreality of the world. It is almost a natural point of view, consistent with experience, to regard the world as real. The burden of proof of unreality of the world rests on those who declare it to be so. For the realist it is enough to say that the world is real because in all our actions and reactions in daily life we tacitly assume the world to be real. Let them prove who say so the unreality of the world. Sri Madhwacharya therefore after adducing proofs demonstrate the realism of the world devotes a great part in his works to the refutation of the doctrine of illusoriness of the world.
Pramanas in favour of the reality of the world
The three pramanas Pratyaksha, Anumana and Agama prove the reality of the world. Reality consists in being unsublated and there are some pieces of knowledge, which are never sublated (na dukhanubhavah kvapi mithyanubhavatam vrajet (A.V. p. 36) - The experience of misery can never become falsified). The objects of such knowledge must necessarily be real, and the world of such objects must be real indeed. It has already been explained that internal knowledge is always unsublated. The Sakshi experiences pleasure and pain and such experience being unsublated show that pleasure and pain are real. The Sakshi perceives space and time in all perceptions. Even in my perception of a rope as a snake before me now although the knowledge of the rope arising later sublates the prior knowledge of the snake, the spatial and temporal elements ‘before me’ and ‘now’ are not sublated. It is a fact that I perceived ‘before me’ at ‘that time' something or other the nature which I might have mistaken. There is no denying knowledge of spatial and temporal elements. They therefore turn out to be real. The Acharya therefore says 'satyatvam gaganadescha sakshipratyakshadhitam’ - the reality of space and time are demonstrated from the evidence of pratyaksha of Sakshi, the perceiving self. The objects of the world such as houses, hills, rivers, horses etc., are revealed in pratyaksha as existing. Such revelation in pratyaksha is the proof of their reality because they are revealed as existing in space and time, which is the essence of reality. Some perceptions are. however, false. But that a perception is false can be determined only by another perception whose validity cannot be questioned and to question such validity would be to land in infinite regress. When I want to know what I perceive as a snake is really a snake I go near and observe to better advantage and the perception under more favourable circumstances convince me that the snake is real if the later perception also presents a snake. If I cannot believe or trust the later and more trustworthy perception, I want one more perception which in turn may require another and so on. In such case I never can really know whether what I see before me is a snake or not and my future action would be undecided. But such however is not the case in actual experience. Were it so, life would be impossible. We have to and we do stop at some stage or other and say, ‘now this must be true'. The decisive ultimate stage can, however, only be another perception or pratyaksha and hence pratyaksha or perception can and will reveal reality. In fact, all our actions and reactions are based on presuming reality of objects revealed in perception or pratyaksha unless they are falsified by a later pratyaksha. That a former pratyaksha revealed a false object can be decided only by a later pratyaksha. Now there is no evidence whatever that the world presented to us in experience in pratyaksha is not real. In perceiving an object, the Sakshi perceives it as existing normally, and in case there is no sublation, decides the object perceived to be real. In so far as the Sakshi is satisfied and convinced about the existence of the object at the time of perception the object must be deemed to be real. Some perceptions are known to be fallacious such as perception of the apparent sizes of distant objects. The moon appears one foot in diameter although the real diameter is many miles. We know in experience that distance deceives in this matter of size and no one will mistake the apparent size for the true size. Such perception is known to be fallacious or inept (apatu). Barring therefore the cases of such fallacious perception and the cases of possible illusions, pratyaksha reveals the world of object as real as also the world of space and time. The world is therefore real.
That the world is real may also be proved on the evidence of Anumana. The form of the Anumana can be – ‘The world is real because it is the object of true knowledge (vimatam satyam pramanadrishtavat yathatma (Mi. Kh. P.I.)), just as Brahman’. Now whatever the object of true knowledge is real. Brahman must be revealed in a true knowledge. Even so whatever else is revealed in true knowledge, must like Brahman, be real. The knowledge of some objects in the world is true because it is not sublated and so the objects revealed by such knowledge must be real. A second syllogism runs thus: ‘the world is real because it produces effects’ (arthakriyakaritvaccha satyatwa sadhanam bhavati (Vadavali)). Whatever produces real effects must be real. The objects of the world produce effects in us such as desire, hope etc., and goad us to activity and striving. The objects and the world of such objects are therefore real.
Realism or reality of the world is declared un-equivocally in the Agamas. In the shruti ‘vishwam satyam maghavanayuvorlda paschana praminathivratam vam' (R.V. 2. 24.12) – ‘You intelligent Indra and Brihaspati! Your world is real. The gods know about your protecting the world’ - the world is declared to be real. In the ‘shruti yacchiketa satyamittannamogham’ (R.V. 8- 1-27) - that which He created is real and not without capacity to produce effects (is real because of the capacity to produce effects) - the world created by God is said to be real and real because it can produce effects. In the shruti ‘kavirmanisi paribhooh swayambhooh yathathathyato- arthan vyadadhat saswati-bhyasambhyah’ (Isa-Up) it is said that God who is omniscient and omnipotent and independent created the world of reality at all times. In a similar manner a host of shrutis and puranic passages may be quoted declaring the reality of the world. The Bhagavadgita (16-8:9) says that those that call the world unreal or asatya are people who have lost the true vision and by doing so they harm the world.
Refutation of the Doctrine of Anirvachaniyatva of the world
The Advaita Vedanta holds that the world is Mithya or anirvachaniya. By anirvachaniya is meant being different from real and also from unreal. The world, it is said, lacks the characteristic of the real, as also the characteristic of the unreal and should therefore be regarded as neither real nor unreal. The world is sadasadvilakshana i.e., different from sat (or real) and asat (or unreal). Sadasadvilakshana and anirvachaniya are synonyms. The characteristic of the real is ‘being unsublated’. Brahman is real because knowledge about Him cannot be sublated. But the knowledge of the world will be sublated after one attains the true knowledge of the Brahman and so the world cannot be real. Again, what is unreal cannot be perceived as for example the horns of human being or the flower in the sky. The world, however, is perceived by one and all and cannot therefore be unreal. Such is the argument in favour of the world being regarded as anirvachaniya. Another argument advanced in favour of the world being Mithya is the famous syllogism of the Advaita Vedanta. The world is Mithya, because it is perceived, just as the silver in the shell. Whatever is perceived is Mithya is the form of this syllogism. The shrutis also are said to declare the Mithyatva of the world. In the Rigveda the Naradiya Sookta speaks of tamas (avidya i.e. Cosmic Ignorance) – ‘nasaddasit nosadasittadanimnasid rajo novyomaparo yat. anidavatam swadhayatadekam atama asit’ (Rigveda) — ‘there was neither sat then (during the great deluge) nor was there asat. nor rajas, nor the all-pervading space. He alone was there by Himself’. There was tamas. The tamas said to exist during the great dissolution before the creation of the world is the Cosmic Ignorance, which is the material cause of the world. Since neither sat nor asat was existing then what existed must have been different from sat or asat i.e., must have been sadasadvilakshana likewise. Again, the Shruti ‘maydmatramidam dvaitam advaitam paramarthatah’ (Ma.Up) says the world of difference is mere illusion and non-difference is alone real. The world, it is said by the Advaita school, is the product of ajnana (Cosmic Ignorance). Such ignorance is said to be of two kinds viz., maya and avidya. Maya is the power by which illusion is occasioned to an individual and avidya is the power by which everyone is subjected to the illusion. A mesmerist or magician produces illusion to his audience but is himself no victim of such illusion. The mirage is an illusion to everyone. The world is a big cosmic illusion caused by beginningless avidya and is therefore not real.
Sri Madhwacharya refutes the above arguments advanced by the Advaita school. At the very outset he knocks down the very concept of anirvachaniya or sadasadvilakshana and says that there is no warrant at all for such a concept. 'sadasadvilakshane pramanabhavat’ (V.T.V.7)- there is no evidence for the concept of sadasadvilakshana. In experience either a thing is real (sat) or unreal (asat) but it cannot be different from real and also from unreal. When a thing is not real it is unreal and when a thing is not unreal it is real. There is no halfway house. We have experience of only two categories viz., real, or unreal and we have no experience of category, which can be characterized as being neither real nor unreal (sadasatordvayoreva sarvairanubhyamanatvat (V.T.V. p.7)). The concept of anirvachaniya or sadasadvilakshana is therefore unwarranted by experience. In the Nasadiya Sookta quoted above by the Advaita school the words sat or asat cannot mean real or unreal respectively which are however their normal word meanings. There is difficulty in the Shruti itself for retaining these meanings for those words. If we assume that sat means real and asat means unreal and that since both are negated tamas is different from real and from unreal. This, however, is not possible since according to Advaita Brahman is Real. If therefore this Sookta is taken to declare tamas or Cosmic Ignorance as Sadasadvilakshana, we will have to admit that Brahman is also sadasadvilakshana. It is therefore obvious that the words 'sat’ and ‘asat’ in the present context have meaning different from their usual word meanings. Sri Madhwacharya therefore says that in accordance with the Maadhyandina Shruti ‘yadanyadva yoschantariksacchaetatsat' Tejas which is different from air and akasha is sat. Prithvi, Ap and Tejas are sat and air and akasha asat. The sookta in negating the existence of ‘sat’ and ‘asat’ during the great dissolution negates the existence of the five elements in their gross form. They were as yet uncreated. The Nasadiya sookta therefore cannot be regarded to support the concept of sadasadvilakshana.
The argument that the world is different from the real because it is sublated and different from the unreal because it is perceived is not valid. Sri Madhwacharya says ‘na cha badhyam jagadityatra kinchinmanam' (Tatv.). There is not the slightest evidence to show that the world is sublated either now or at some future time. There is no evidence that the world consisting of space and time and matter is sublated by any later knowledge as known in pratyaksha. It cannot be said that the syllogism trying to establish the anirvachaniyatva of the world sublates the world, because that would be begging the question. The world can be said to be anirvachaniyatva only after it is shown that it is sublated. The shruti ‘jnatedwaitam na vidyate' although apparently means that the world of differences vanishes after the knowledge of Brahman, is shown after examination to yield an entirely different meaning. That it is not possible to show that the world is or can be sublated. If it cannot be shown to be sublated it cannot be proved to be different from real. Again, it is not quite correct to say that the unreal cannot be perceived to be known. Unless we know what is unreal, we cannot know that which is different from unreal. Thus, the arthapatti of the Advaitin becomes invalidated.
The syllogism ‘the world is Mithya (illusory) because it is perceived just as the silver in the shell’ bristles with innumerable fallacies. At the outset the Advaitin would find it difficult to say exactly what the word Mithya means. The usual meaning of the word Mithya is unreal. But since the Advaita holds that the world is different also from unreal, the word Mithya cannot mean unreal in the present case. It cannot mean anirvachaniya because the concept of anirvachaniya is wholly untenable. Then again, to say that what is perceived or known is Mithya would be a dangerous generalization. According to Advaita. release from bondage results from the knowledge of Brahman. Hence Brahman must be known. He becomes Mithya because whatever is known is said to be Mithya. In the Advaitic syllogism three Hetus or middle terms are adduced to support the Sadhya. The world is said to be Mithya because it is perceived, because it is a jada and because it is paricchinna or limited. Jadatva means a pramatritva (not being the knower). The world is Mithya because it is not the knower is the meaning of syllogism, with the second Hetu embodied in it. Now, according to Advaita. Brahman also is not a knower because He is without attributes such as knowership etc. He is Nirguna. If He is not a knower, He must be Mithya according to the syllogism. ‘The world is Mithya because it is limited’ is the form of the syllogism with the third Hetu embedded in it. But that the world is limited in not wholly true. The world of space and time is unlimited (anantha) and infinite. Again, the Advaitin cannot post the middle term about the world as ‘because it is perceived’. Being perceived means being known. Now suppose we ask the Advaitin, is it known that there is the quality of ‘being known’ in the world. If the answer is in the affirmative, then the quality ‘being known’ must be admitted to be Mithya or unreal because whatever is known is Mithya (according to the postulate). So if ‘being known’ is Mithya, it would mean that such a quality of as being known does not exist which will then mean that the world cannot be Mithya (because the quality of ‘being known’ does not exist in it). If, however, the answer is in the negative, it would mean that the quality of ‘being known’ is not known. In other words, we do not know that there is the Hetu viz., ‘being known’ and so we can have no knowledge of sadhya. If I have no knowledge of the Hetu like smoke I cannot have knowledge of Sadhya like fire. Since I do not know the Hetu ‘being perceived’ I cannot know that the world is Mithya.
The world according to the Advaita school is the result of big cosmic illusion. It is however, very difficult to admit the world to be an illusion at the same time admitting two other real world. Illusions always presuppose at least two real entitles. Therefore, Sri Madhwacharya says ‘bhrantikalpita-vechajagataha- satyam jagdvayamapekshitam' (V.T. V.p. 14) ….' to say that the world is an illusion would require at least two other real worlds'. It is not possible for the illusion of silver in shell if there be no real silver and no real shell. Now let us examine what the elements are that are required to produce an illusion. In the case of the illusion of silver in a shell an object before us appears to us as silver and when we go near the object it is found to be not silver but shell. The silver appears to be in the place of the shell. Now if there was no shell before us, we could not have had the illusion. The basis (adhishtana) of the illusion is shell. Again, if we have never seen silver before, we cannot have the illusion of silver in the shell. Lastly, we mistake the shell for silver and not for a bark. This is because there is some resemblance (sadrashya). Because of a piece of real silver before and we must have a real shell before us now and there must be some resemblance between them. Now if the world is to be regarded as an illusion, we will have to admit of two real worlds, which resemble the illusory world. Would it not be wiser and philosophically more economical to accept our world as real instead of having to posit two other real worlds?
The doctrine of un-reality or illusoriness or anirvachaniyatva of the world thus stands refuted in the system of Sri Madhwacharya.