Chapter 8 - The Concept of Difference
Concept of Difference is Untenable says Advaita
The relation between the three entities (tatwatraya) viz, Ishwara, chit (animate beings) and achit (inanimate matter) is a matter of fundamental speculation in all the systems of Indian Philosophy. The relation is conceived of in different ways in the different systems. Advaita regards the chit as non-different from Ishwara or Brahman and the achit as mere illusion lacking in substance. Vishishtadvaita regards the chit and achit as the modes of Brahman and therefore non different from Him. The Bhedabheda School regards relation as one of difference and non- difference as well. Sri Madhwacharya, however, regards the world of animate and inanimate beings as essentially different from Him and essentially different from one another. In fact Sri Madhwacharya adumbrates five-old difference (pancha-bheda) between any two of three entities viz., between Ishwara and the individual soul (chit), between Ishwara and inanimate matter (achit) between one individual soul and another, between individual souls and inanimate matter and between one inanimate matter (jada) and another.
The essential point about difference is that two entities said to be different are different in their essence (swaroopa) or in the stuff of which they are made. But such a difference does not. however, preclude mutual influence on one another. Ishwara in spite of being essentially different from chit and achit is however their overlord. They are dependent on Him for their very existence and sustenance. In fact, it is their very dependence on Him that indicates their essential difference between Him and the world of animate and inanimate beings. We may speak of Ishwara as non- different from the world in the sense that the world cannot exist but for Him and He is in His very essence different from the world. The implication of difference (bheda) in Sri Madhwacharya’s systems is that the essences of the entities are different.
Refutation of the untenability of Difference
It is a matter of common experience that we distinguish between the various objects which are revealed to us in knowledge. When I see a chair, the content of my knowledge is different from the content of my knowledge when I see a pot. Both when I see them together and separately, I understand that they are different. The question is whether we really perceive a difference between a chair and a pot. Advaita would say that it is not possible to admit that we perceive difference at all. The concept of difference, it says, is riddled with inconsistencies. Now difference (bheda) is a relation between two objects like chair and pot. The relation cannot exist of itself because we do not perceive difference as such. We perceive difference between two objects. Difference has reference to two objects. Therefore, difference must be conceived to reside in either of the objects or in both. In the former case the difference reside in one object and the content of difference would be the form ‘the pot has the quality being different from the chair’. In saying ‘the pot has the quality’ the difference is attributed as residing in the pot as a quality and in saying ‘being different from the chair' the difference is regarded as having a reference to the other object. To affirm such a quality as ‘difference’ in the pot, which has a reference to a chair, one must have the knowledge of the chair as different from the pot. Thus, the realization of difference between the pot and the chair would involve a prior knowledge of their difference which would depend on the realization of their difference. It is said that difference resides in both objects or being qualified by them. We would have to say, ‘the pot and the chair are different’ or there is a difference between the pot and the chair’. In either case we cannot perceive mere difference and we can only perceive difference between two objects or two objects being different. Now to say that the pot and the chair are different we must know the pot and the chair from which it is different; otherwise, we cannot say that the pot and the chair are different. Or to say that we perceive a difference between the pot and the chair we must know a pot. which is different from the chair. Thus, to know the difference between two objects a prior knowledge of their difference is necessary, and the prior knowledge of their difference would involve a knowledge of their difference. We therefore find it extremely difficult to explain the knowledge of difference. Again, difference, if it exists must exist in the objects either identical with them or different from them. It cannot be said to be identical with the objects because if it were so the object and difference would become synonymous. Nor it is possible to say that it (difference) is different from the objects. To admit so would be to admit another difference between from the one before it and so on ad infinitum. This would compel us to admit of infinity of differences so that the nature of the first difference becomes indeterminate. From all these considerations says Advaita, the concept of difference becomes untenable and difference is only seeming and cannot be real.
Difference is Identical with the object
Sri Madhwacharya, however, cuts away the circular arguments said to be involved in the concept of difference by declaring the difference is identical with the object Itself 'padarthawarupatwat bhedasya' (V.P.V.p. 6). The difference of a pot from the chair lies in its potness, which is identical with the pot and the difference of a chair from the pot lies in its chaimess. When I perceive a pot, I perceive its potness also and in perceiving its potness I realize that it is different from chariness, cowness, or any otherness. In experience whenever we see an object, we see the object as different from the objects. As the Acharya says 'praya sarvato vailaksyanyam hi adarthaswarupam drushyate' (V.T.V.p.6). Generally, an object is perceived as different from all other objects (The exceptions are cases of doubt when we are not sure whether the object is one thing or another similar to it. When we see a lamppost from a distance at dusk we are not sure whether what we see is a lamp-post or a person standing there). Now why should we say that difference is identical with the object?
Difference is one of essence
Sri Madhwacharya answers by saying that if we do not admit that difference is identical with the object, we would not able to realize it as distinguished from other objects – ‘yadi na swarupam bhedah tada padarhe drishte prayah sarvato vailakshanyam tasya na jnayeta’ (V.T.V.p.6.). Now how do we know that when we see an object, we see it as differentiated from other objects? Again, says Sri Madhwacharya ‘ajnate cha vailakshanye atmani ghatah ityapi samsyayab syat ....nahi kaschit samaayam karoti’ (V.T.V.p.6). If we do not perceive an object as differentiated from other objects, then we should legitimately feel a doubt about its nature and confuse it with other objects like our 'selves’. It is because we do not perceive the difference between a lamppost and a person at a distance during dusk that we feel a doubt about the object we see. The non-perception of difference should result when there is doubt about the nature of the object perceived. But in experience we do not have any such doubt. When I see an object outside, I do not confuse it with my ‘self’ and I perceive it as differentiated from myself. Perceiving an object is perceiving as differentiated from other objects (bhedastu swaroopadarshanadeva siddah) (V.T.V. p.6). Although difference (bheda) is identical with the object we can speak of difference as if it were different from the object by the relation of what is called savisheshabheda or qualified non-difference. The qualification removes synonymousness of object and difference and non- difference declares that it is identical with the object. There is between the ‘difference' and the 'object', a difference without a distinction.
The five-fold difference between Jiva. Jada and Paramatma
The difference contemplated by Sri Madhwacharya is a difference in essence. The five- fold differences can be proved on the basis of experience. In the first place we have to admit the fundamental difference between chit and achit (sentient beings and non-sentient matter). What differentiates matter from sentient beings is the want of capacity to know. The capacity to know i.e., the capacity to comprehend is the prerogative of intelligent beings or souls. In the psychology of perception, we have the object perceived at one end and the perceiver who is the subject at the other end. The subject of knowledge is the perceiver called sakshi. which has the capacity to comprehend. Matter cannot comprehend things. Thus, we can differentiate between matter and intelligent beings called souls (jivas). Again, we can differentiate between one kind of jada (non- sentient matter) and another. For example, the Sakshi perceives space (Akasha) and time as real existents. Space and time are non-sentient and are therefore essentially different from sentient beings (jivas). Space and time are the receptacles for everything else including non-sentient matter. Space is again perceived directly by sakshi. Thus, from the epistemological basis of Sri Madhwacharya’s system we can establish the difference between the outside objects which are generally jadas and the perceiving entity, which is the jiva, the former forming the object and the latter the subject in any perception or piece of knowledge. Again, from the concept of Sakshi and the allied or associated concepts of space and time which are directly perceived by the sakshi we can establish the difference between one jada (like space) and another (like time).
An analysis of experience would show the essential difference between one sentient being and another. We all have self-knowledge as when we say, ‘I know myself’. Whatever doubts I may have about every other thing in the universe I am at least sure about my own existence. If I doubt about my own existence, I cannot believe in anything else. Now this sense of I-ness persists in all human beings throughout their lives. Whatever changes may take place about me. whatever, vicissitudes I undergo, whatever changes may take place in my physical body I never feel I am 'not-I’. This persistence of ‘I am I’ in spite of all changes in other respects points to the community of the entity called the soul and its difference from non-sentient matter is borne out by its capacity to comprehend. It is the I that feels and that knows. Thus, I know that I exist in my body, that I am different from my body and that I am non-material in nature (swaroopa). Now how do I know that 'selves’ similar to me who have the capacity to comprehend and who are also sentient like myself, exist? Sri Madhwacharya says we can infer the existence of other selves like us from the similarity of behaviour of their physical bodies and ours: ’cheshtalingena satmatve paradehasya sadhite' (U.Kh.p.l). We can establish the existence of souls in the bodies of others from the behaviour of their bodies. My body behaves and reacts in some way and the bodies of other human beings behave and react in the same ways. I therefore infer that their bodies do possess souls even as my body possesses ‘me’ as the soul. Thus, we have souls inhabiting the various human bodies. Now do these souls inhabit the various human bodies? Now are these souls identical or different from one another? Sri Madhwacharya says it is a matter of experience that we feel different from other selves - ’anyatvam svatmanah tasmat sarvairevanubhuyate’ (U.Kh. p.l). If my ‘self’ and the ‘self’ of my friend are not different but identical then whenever I experience happiness, he must also experience happiness and whenever 1 have the knowledge of some object he too must have the knowledge of the same object. Our experiences must be identical. Such however is not the case and we are therefore different from each other. Thus, we are aware of ourselves in our self- perception, of other selves from inference and we are aware of the difference between ourselves and other selves in actual experience. The difference between individual souls again stands established on the basis of experience.
It now remains to demonstrate the difference between Ishwara and the individual souls on one hand and between Ishwara and Jada on the other. So far as the latter is concerned, it would be sufficient to remark that Ishwara who on all hands Is considered as pure knowledge and pure bliss must essentially be different from jada or non-sentient matter. But meta-physicists are not wanting who would declare even the non-sentient portion of the universe as a manifestation of Ishwara or Brahman. Brahman, it is said, is the material cause (upadana karana) of the world of sentient and non-sentient beings composing the world.
The Vishishtadvaita system regards Brahman as the parinama upadana of the world i.e., Brahman has transformed Himself into the form of the world. The Vishishtadvaitin however cannot really accept Brahman as the material cause of the world in a literal sense just as mud or clay is the material cause of a pot. Because it would be ridiculous in the extreme to say that Brahman who is pure unalloyed Bliss and pure Intelligence transforms Himself into the miserable creatures of the earth and into non-intelligent matter. When therefore pressed to explain his position the Vishishtadvaitin answers by saying that the world of sentient and non-sentient beings though different from Brahman are his modes or his Body and Brahman with these in the finer state takes the form of the world with these in the gross state. It is clear from this that what undergoes a change is not Brahman but the sentient and non-sentient beings from the finer (sookshma) to the gross (sthoola) state and Brahman cannot be regarded as the material cause in the accepted sense of the term (The argument against the Vishishtadvaita view is forcefully and put in the pages of Nyayasudha (p 196-199)).
The Advaita regards Brahman as the vivarta upadana of the world. In the illusion of the silver in the shell there is nothing other than shell from which silver may be regarded to have sprung up. The shell is the basis of silver although the shell has not been actually transformed into silver. The silver appears in the shell and the shell may therefore be regarded as the upadana of the silver and it is only what may be termed vivarta upadana ‘as if it was the material cause’. In this sense Brahman, it is said, is the upadana of the world. Such a view is however untenable since that the world is not an illusion, as Advaita would have it.
To regard our world as an illusion we have to admit of two other real worlds, which would be a superfluous procedure, it being easier to accept our world alone as real. Ishwara is therefore different from non-sentient portion of the world. Sri Madhwacharya seeks to demonstrate the difference between Ishwara and the individual soul again on the basis of experience. It has already been pointed out that the Sakshi has experience of misery sometimes. Such an experience cannot be unreal because it is not sublated at any future time. 'na dukhanubhavakvapi mithyanubhavatam vrajet’ says Sri Madhwacharya (A.V.p.36) - the experience of misery can never become false. This is because as he says again, ‘nahi badhah kvachiddrhstah duhkhadyanubhavasya tu' (A.V.p.36). There is no sublation of experience of misery at any time. Thus, the individual soul emerges as an entity tainted with misery. Ishwara or Brahman is declared in the scriptures as pure Bliss (Ananda) and therefore there must be an essential difference between Brahman and the individual souls. Sri Madhwacharya again says ‘ajanata chalpashaktitvam duhkhitvam swalpakartrata sarvagnatadisagunaviruddha hyanubhutigh’ (Up.Kh.P.I) - ignorance, limited power, misery, and limited capacity to create are what we experience. We also experience the difference from the attributes of Brahman whose powers are unlimited, and attributes are infinite.
The argument against the Vishishtadvaita view is forcefully and clearly put in the pages of Nyayasudha (p. -196-199).
Harmonization of Bheda and Abheda shrutis
It would now be time enough to consider the problem of difference on the basis of scriptures. In the first place there are what are called bheda shrutis and abheda shrutis i.e., shrutis which appear to declare difference between Brahman and the individual soul and Shrutis which appear to declare their identity or non-difference. All the Acharyas have tried to reconcile the two classes of Shrutis to harmonize with their system of metaphysics. Sri Madhwacharya harmonizes the Shrutis on the basis of a fundamental postulate in his epistemology. Whenever there is a conflict (seeming) between two pramanas, that pramana which has the prerogative (i.e., upajeevya) In the matter under discussion must have superior validity and the other pramana has to be interpreted so as not to contradict the former. The difference between individual souls and God is a matter cognizable by pratyaksha and pratyaksha has greater validity than Agama in this matter. No Agama can therefore invalidate the decision of Pratyaksha and therefore abheda Shrutis cannot inculcate identity of Brahman and individual souls. But that, however, is not the only point. Sri Madhwacharya has considered in great detail almost all the abheda Shrutis quoted by the other schools and on the basis of internal evidence in them shows that the abheda Shrutis do not inculcate identify of essence of Brahman and the individual souls. In the Vishnu Tatva Vinirnaya and the Gita Tatparya he examines the abheda Shrutis in detail and shows clearly that their purport is very different from declaring essential identity of Brahman and the individual souls. He supports his interpretations with proper quotations of smrithis and puranas and short of total rejection of the authorities quoted by him it is difficult to disagree with him.
Examination of the Shruti - Tatvamasi
The famous shruti 'Tatvamasi' in the sixth canto of the Chandogya Upanishad finds detailed and incisive elucidation. In his works and Sri Madhwacharya reads the Shruti as father sage Uddalaka teaches 'Atatvamasi' to Swetaketu. The context in which the upadesha occurs says, Sri Madhwacharya, is essentially unfavorable for an upadesha inculcating identity. Swetaketu after twelve years of study of the Vedas comes back to his father, with no small amount of pride about his attainments and does not greet his father with the customary salute appropriate for a meeting of a son and a father. Uddalaka realizes that the want of courtesy on the part of Swetaketu is due to his pride of attainments (mahamanah) and wants to disabuse the mind of his son. To declare to a person who is so proud already that he is God would be extremely inappropriate as Sri Madhwacharya points out. Uddalaka therefore begins by describing the process of creation and activity of the world, which cannot by any amount of pride be imagined to be within the reach of Swetaketu. The description of the process of creation in ‘sadeva somyedamagra asit’ (Ch.Up.6th Ch.) is intended to demonstrate the utter dependence of all things on God as Sri Madhwacharya says 'tadwasatwajnapanarthancha sadeva somyedamagrasitidityadi srstikathanam’ (V.T.V.p.7). The upadesha ‘Atatvamasi’ is supported in the Upanishad by nine illustrations. Sri Madhwacharya examines each illustration in detail and demonstrates that each illustration, far from inculcating identity, indicates difference and some relation between Ishwara and the individual soul. The very first illustration is the case of a bird, which tied to a peg by a string, tries to fly hither and thither and unable to fly away from the peg goes back to the peg which is its support. It is easy to realize the analogy of the bird to the individual soul and the peg to Brahman on whom the former is dependent. The Upanishad says further that just as the peg is the support for the bird sat or Brahman is the source (sanmulah) of all (sarvah prajah), the sat is the support of all (sadayatanah) and the sat is the final goal of all (satpatistaha). In this way each illustration implies some relation between Brahman and the individual soul and not one illustration implies identity (For a detailed elucidation of the shruti, the interested reader is referred to tika on Vishnu Tatva Vinirnaya). Therefore, says Sri Madhwacharya, ‘na chayam abhedopadeshah’ (V.T.V.p.7) - ‘this is not a precept inculcating identity'.
Again, Uddalaka speaks of that thing knowing which is equivalent to knowing all else. The thing referred to obviously is Brahman and knowing Brahman is equivalent to knowing all else. If Brahman is the only Reality all else would be Mithya and to say that knowing Reality is equivalent, to knowing all else, which is Mithya, would be ridiculous in the extreme. As Sri Madhwacharya says ‘na hi satyajnanena mithya jnanam bhavati’ (V.T.V.p.7) - the knowledge of phenomenal (appearance) cannot result from the knowledge of the real. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to say that by knowing Brahman it would be equivalent to knowing all else dependent on Him. When I am introduced to the Mayor or the first citizen of a town I am as good as introduced to the people of the town.
The Shruti ‘yatra tvasya sarvamatmaiva bhutat kenakam pashyet’ (Br. Up. 4-5-15) says in that place where all become Atman how can one see and with what (instrument) can one see. This Shruti would seem to imply that in the final place of rest (salvation) all become identical with Atman. But says Sri Madhwacharya. this Shruti does not purport to declare identity of all with Atman. On the other hand, the Shruti only objects to the idea of identity of all with Atman. The objection is, if It is assumed that all become identified with Atman there can be no seeing, no knowledge and no experiencing in the state of Mukthi. But the Chandogya Shruti says that such activities do obtain in the state of Mukthi 'sayatra paryeti jakshan kritjan ramamanah’ (Ch. Up. 8.12-3) - he, the released soul enjoys himself in various ways. Such activity would not be consistent with identity of all with Brahmans. The shruti in question cannot therefore be pressed to support identity of Brahman and individual souls.
Abheda as declared in the shruti need not, says Sri Madhwacharya, refer to identity in essence between Brahman and individual souls. Abheda may be figurative as when we say, ‘we are all one in this matter’. We are all one in the sense that our opinion in this matter is the same. When we say ‘we are all one’ when we are in a sinking ship, we mean we are all in the same helpless state. When we look at a picture of a lion, we say ‘it is a lion', surely, we do not mean that the picture is really a lion. We only mean it looks like a lion. Statements of non-difference or abheda are employed even in case of difference when we intend to convey some significant idea. In a like manner all the abheda Shrutis without exception can be understood in a figurative sense both from the point of internal evidence in the shrutis themselves and from implications inherent in them. This is the burden of the method employed by Sri Madhwacharya in his treatment of the abheda Shrutis.
A host of Shrutis can be quoted which declare the essential difference between Brahman and the individual souls. The Shruti 'dwasuparna sayuja sakhayah' (Atha. Up.3-5) refers to two birds nestling in the human body, one which lives on the food it eats (viz. the jiva) and the other that thrives without eating (viz the paramatman). The Shruti further says that when the former realizes the latter as his master (Isha) he is released from bondage. The way to salvation says another Shruti lies in realizing Brahman as different (prathak) and as the propeller(preritaram)- 'prithagatmanam pritarancha matva’ (Svet Up. 1-6). The Shruti ‘inajnau-ishanisau’ (Svet.Up) refers to the individual soul and Brahman as two entities, one the knower (jiva) and the other known (Brahman); one the Isha or Lord (Brahman) and the other the anisha or non-Lord (jiva). The Advaita system however tries to explain away the bheda Shrutis by saying that the bheda Shrutis are intended for contemplation in the lower stage of spiritual discipline and for purification of the mind which is very much vitiated by worldliness. After such purification the mind becomes capable of comprehending the identity taught in the abheda Shrutis. Sri Jayathirtha, however, exposes the fallacy of maintaining such view. By contemplating Brahman as different from me. the idea of difference between Brahman and me becomes more and more deeply ingrained in me. Surely this is not the way to prepare me to realize identity. The proper course for developing the idea on identity (if such be the true purport of the shrutis) would be to dispel all shades of difference one by one and lead on to idea of non-difference or identity.
The Brahma sutras after prescribing the contemplation or meditation of Brahman as the means of liberation from bondage (samsara) in the first aphorism proceeds to define Brahman in the second aphorism as the author of creation and of other activities with respect to the world. In doing so says Sri Madhwacharya the sutrakara emphatically refutes the idea of identity of Ishwara and Jiva because by no stretch of imagination can the jiva be regarded as having any part in the creation of the world (‘atho jivaikyamapicha nirachakre jagadguruh riahj janmadi hetutvam jivasya jagato bhavet') (A.V.p.5). The Sutrakara is again careful to say at the end that the released soul in the state of Mukthi has nothing to do whatever with the process of creation in the sutra ‘jagadvyapara varjyam’ (4-4-27). In the sutra ‘prithagupadeshat' (2-3-28) the sutrakara says that the individual souls are ‘prithak’ that is different from Brahman because the Shrutis inculcate such a difference. Sri Madhwacharya therefore exclaims with the Shruti ‘satyam bhida satyam bhida’- difference is real, difference is real.